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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with the interaction of U.S. 
agricultural exports, regional patterns of farm production 
and the environmental problem of sediment emanating from agri­
culture. It also evaluates alternative policies in abating sedi 
mentation to the nation's main river basins. An underlying 
hypothesis of the study is that changes in agricultural export 
demands cause shifts in the comparative advantage among pro­
ducing regions within the U.S., and alter regional patterns, 
farm incomes, consumer food prices and soil loss. Given this 
hypothesis, the study uses a mathematical model, and two esti­
mates of the U.S. 1985 agricultural exports to investigate if 
and how these interactions might occur. 
The second aspect of this study stems from the inter­
action of agricultural exports and mainstream sedimentation. 
Changes in agricultural exports which enhance row crop, (corn, 
soybean and cotton) production increase soil loss. Soil loss 
not only reduces future farm production, but also its sedi­
ment in the nation's waterways imposes a negative externality 
on society. In recognizing this possible sediment diseconomy 
of agricultural exports, the study uses two different poli­
cies aimed at restricting sediment to the nation's waterways. 
The policies are analyzed using the two 1985 export demand 
estimates, and the results are compared with the no policy 
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(Base) scenarios in terms of soil loss, soil conserving 
practices, regional production patterns, farm incomes and 
consumer food prices. 
Background to the Study 
This section is divided into three parts. First, the role 
of agricultural exports is discussed in order to illustrate the 
importance of its investigation. Second, the uncertainty 
associated with agricultural export demand is highlighted. 
This uncertainty led to the study's analysis of alternative 
export demand levels. Finally, the linkage between agricultural 
exports and sediment is discussed in more detail. This linkage 
pertains to the second aspect of the study. 
The role of exports 
The U.S. has an enormous agricultural production capacity 
which cannot be economically saturated by domestic demands. 
Low income elasticities of demand for agricultural products 
and slow population growth in the domestic market restrict 
demand and impede supply expansion. On the other hand, exports 
facilitate production expansion, and provide an avenue whereby 
the U.S. can realize its full agricultural potential without 
the use of stringent supply controls or other auxiliary meas­
ures to stabilize farm prices and incomes. 
More significantly, the value of agricultural exports can 
3 
provide a large proportion of foreign exchange to American 
consiamers for purchasing imported goods and services con­
sidered desirable in meeting their standards of living. 
For example, during the recent agricultural boom years of 
1971-1975, the value of agricultural exports rose from 
$7.8 billion in fiscal year 1971 to $21.6 billion in fiscal 
year 1975, and the proportion of total export earnings rose 
from 18% in 1971 to 25% in 1974 (Table 1.1). Further, the 
statistics for the years 1971-1977 show that the value of 
agricultural exports acted as a positive influence in 
stabilizing the balance of trade accounts. 
The above roles of U.S. agricultural exports are neither 
novel or incidental. The importance is clearly expressed in 
the U.S. trade policy arrangements which seek to link agri­
cultural and industrial trade arrangements despite strong 
opposition from other market organizations, Tontz [32]. Also, 
Section 103 of the 1974 Trade Act [34] states: 
. . .  t o  t h e  m a x i m u m  e x t e n t  f e a s i b l e ,  t h e  h a r m o n i z a ­
tion, reduction, or the elimination of agricultural 
trade barriers and distortions shall be undertaken in 
conjunction with the harmonization, reduction or 
elimination of industrial trade barriers and dis­
tortions . 
Despite the well-known importance of agricultural ex­
ports, farm prices and incomes, and foreign exchange earnings 
continue to fluctuate. One reason for this instability is the 
uncertainty associated with export demands. 
Table 1.1. U.S. merchandise exports and trade ba lance 1971-1977^ (Source; USDA [1] and [38]) 
Fiscal U.S. Exports Agriculture U.S. Trade Balance 
Year (million dollars) contribution (million dollars) 
Agriculture Nonagriculture Total % Agriculture Nonagricultural Total 
1971 7,753 35,910 43,663 18 1,925 -986 939 
1972 8,046 36,802 44,848 18 1,998 -7,206 -5,208 
1973 12,902 44,913 87,815 22 5,578 -9,152 -3,574 
1974 21,293 63,631 84,924 25 11,744 -9,323 2,421 
1975 21,578 81,280 102,858 21 11,999 -10,201 1,798 
1976 22,759 90,032 112,791 20 12, 244 -13,964 -1,720 
1977 24,014 96,354 120,368 20 10,631 -33,732 -23,101 
^Domestic exports include Department of Defense shipments (F.A.S.) value. 
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The uncertainty of exports 
The demand for U.S. agricultural exports depends on 
favorable market forces, world climatic conditions and insti­
tutional arrangements. These components enter the aggregate 
demand with different "degrees" of uncertainty, adding to 
the instability of export demand. Although there is some 
theoretical controversy surrounding the welfare gains 
(losses) from this instability. Just et al. [22] and Hueth 
and Schmitz [20], the crucial point is that this instability 
is transmitted to farm prices and incomes, and foreign ex­
change revenues. Historical evidence has vindicated this 
effect; amid projections of scarcity and higher prices in 
1966, farm prices and income were again depressed by 1968. 
The recent experience of the early seventies provides another 
example. The prolonged increase in worldwide demand for 
agricultural commodities and the resulting high farm prices 
and revenues made many observers. Heady and Timmons [18] 
and Crosson [11], query whether these forces were new and 
permanent or a disorder caused by some eclectic composition 
of fortuitous events. Yet, by early 1977, farm prices and 
incomes fell, foreign exchange earnings declined (Table 
1.1), and supply control policies became relevant, Soth 
[30]. 
The instability of agricultural exports and its 
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ramifications on farm prices and incomes, and foreign ex­
change earnings warrants a look at alternative export pre­
dictions. 
Agricultural exports and sediment 
Agricultural exports are not independent of soil loss, 
sedimentation, or agricultural pollution in general. Greater 
agricultural exports stimulate production thereby facilitating 
the use of intensive methods. Such methods imply a greater 
concentration of noxious by-products which create costs to 
society. In the case of sediment or soil loss, both farmers 
and the rest of society may be adversely affected. 
The major cost of soil loss to farmers in the loss of 
future productivity. Plant nutrients such as nitrogen and 
phosphorous are engrained in the top soil. Thus productivity 
is reduced by greater erosion rates which catalyze the removal 
of the upper layer of soil. Even in bottom lands less prone 
to erosion, productivity is impaired by infertile overwash. 
However, this cost to farmers may be obscured by factors 
associated with increasing exports. This cost disguise 
causes less active participation in controlling soil loss 
and therefore sediment. Evidence to this effect is seen in 
a survey of farmers participating in the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (U.S.D.A.) conservation program. The study 
revealed that during the 1971-1975 worldwide increase in 
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export demand, 84% had soil loss in excess of the recommended 
level [35]. 
A number of factors accounts for the decline in im­
portance of the cost of soil loss to farmers in periods of 
increasing export.demands. First, farmers are generally 
faced with institutional arrangements such as land tenure 
agreements which limit their planning horizon. As a result, 
the cost of future productivity may not even enter their 
objective function. Second, if the institutional charac­
teristics were negated and farmers were concerned about 
future productivity, the cost of soil loss may be masked 
by the use of improved seeds and greater fertilizer applica­
tions which tend to maintain or increase yields. Third, even 
if farmers recognized the cost of soil loss, in allocating 
limited funds, they weigh the benefits with the cost of 
conservation. Given the knowledge of a present increase in 
exports and crop prices, and the uncertainty of future demands, 
farmers are apt to relax their goals on soil loss and take ad­
vantage of the present profitability of crops. Hauser and 
Timmons [16] using a sample of farmers in Western Iowa, demon­
strated this effect. The study showed that farmers' goals on 
annual soil loss/acre fell 30% between 1952-1957, but in­
creased 24% between 1957-1975 indicating a direct relation­
ship between soil loss goals and export demands. 
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Society's costs are much more apparent than farmers' costs. 
Sediment is generally accepted as the largest polluter ap­
proximately 50% by volume [35]. Sediment is present on the 
nation's roads, in ditches, canals and rivers. Sediment 
trapped in ditches and canals reduce their holding capacity, 
consequently increasing the danger of floods. For example, 
in 1964 Ford [14] estimated the sediment related upstream 
damage owing to flooding at $87.7 million for the Continental 
U.S. Sediment in commercial and navigational waterways 
represents a hazard, and involves a cost of removal. 
Probably the most important, and the most difficult cost to 
measure, is the cost to society resulting from the loss in 
the aesthetic value of the nation's streams and rivers. Al­
though there is some controversy over the extent to which 
agricultural sediment contributes to the eutrophic^ condi­
tions of the nation's waters, Robinson [28], Carter [8], 
and Wadleigh [45], it is generally accepted that its role 
is considerable. 
^Eutrophication is the process by which a body of water 
ages [33]. In a closed ecosystem, aging is restricted by 
the availability of nitrogen and phosphorous in the food 
chain. Once this system is opened owing to sedimentation, 
the availability of phosphorous and nitrogen increase, and 
the process of eutrophication is enhanced. The effect of 
eutrophication is transmitted to society by increasing 
turbidity in water, beaches with increasing amounts of algae 
residues, substitution among fish species to less desirable 
types, and a general reduction in environmental aesthetics. 
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The Problem 
Agricultural exports can play crucial roles in realizing 
the U.S. full agricultural potential, in buttressing farm in­
come and prices, and in stabilizing foreign exchange earn­
ings. However, export demand uncertainty leads to the fol­
lowing questions; how would production change among the 
regions of the U.S. under different long run export demand 
predictions? Would some regions experience a gain in 
comparative advantage, or would farm incomes change propor­
tionately? Greater demand for exports implies higher domestic 
food prices. Would the domestic consumer food bill rise 
significantly or marginally? How would production tech­
niques and soil loss change? Answers to these questions 
could give policy makers important information for making 
decisions. 
Although a greater demand for agricultural exports en­
courage the above benefits, it is not without disadvantages. 
Exports are positively correlated with sedimentation which im­
poses diseconomies on society. If one of society's goals were 
to reduce sedimentation of the nation's main waterways, then 
what would be the effect of different policies in achieving 
this objective. How would the variables mentioned in the 
previous section change? Would there be drastic or marginal 
differences? Such answers can be useful to the decision-makers 
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in generating a congenial balance between agriculture and its 
stream sediment problem. 
Objectives 
Stemming from the statement of the problem, the ob­
jectives of the study can be divided into two parts. The 
first objective is to quantitatively simulate future national 
and regional changes in soil loss, agricultural production 
and costs under two levels of agricultural exports. The two 
demands project "low" and "high" demand alternatives con­
gruous with the uncertainty associated with agricultural 
exports. 
The second objective is to investigate the problem 
of sediment control by comparing the agricultural related 
effects of two policies aimed at reducing sediment to the 
nation's waterways. The two policies are: (a) the 5 Ton 
Limit which restricts sediment through a physical regula­
tion on crop production requiring activities with no greater 
than 5 tons of gross soil loss/acre annually,^ and (b) the 
"Tax" which uses a cost (tax) on sediment actually reaching 
the main river basins to generate the same national sediment 
2 
standard as the 5 Ton Limit. 
gross soil loss of 5 tons/acre annually is generally 
accepted as the erosion rate which maintains soil fertility 
over time, Beasley [4] and Hudson [19]. 
2 Standards pertain to sediment actually reaching the 
main river basins. 
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Method used in Achieving the 
Objectives 
In achieving the objectives, the study uses a linear 
programming (L.P.) model couched in a multigoal framework. 
The basic model simulates two alternative 1985 fixed point 
export demands to generate the results consistent with the 
first objective. 
The second objective involves the simulation of the 5 
Ton Limit and Tax scenarios. In the case of the 5 Ton Limit, 
simulation occurs after the production activities of the 
model are screened to eliminate those activities in excess 
of 5 tons or gross soil loss/acre. With the Tax, the only 
variation from the basic model was the placement of identi­
cal costs (taxes) on sediment actually reaching the main 
river basins. The identification of the size of the tax 
is determined in two stages. The first step involves using 
the basic model, and the predicted 5 Ton Limit sediment 
standards to generate shadow prices of sediment actually 
reaching the major river basins. These shadow prices are 
not identical but they indicate the general size of the 
tax. The second step uses the information on shadow prices 
to provide an initial tax value in generating the tax which 
achieved the 5 Ton Limit's national sediment standard. 
At the low export level, the tax of $50/ton causes 
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the sediment level to barely exceed that of the 5 Ton Limit; 
at the high export level the sediment level of the 5 Ton 
Limit is underestimated by the same slight margin. 
Plan of Study 
The study was introduced in the first chapter and the 
problem and objectives were revealed. Chapter II investi­
gates modelling procedures capable of analyzing the problem. 
It also considers some theoretical analyses of thë study's 
method. Chapter III includes both a mathematical and non-
mathematical description of the model and a discussion of 
the data sources. The results are presented in Chapter IV. 
A summary of the study with implications and recommendations 
are given in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR ANALYSIS 
Alternative procedures capable of analyzing the problem 
of this study are proposed and compared theoretically with 
the study's method in this chapter. Some of the shortcomings 
of both this study and the alternative methods are illumi­
nated. A theoretical analysis of some of the expected results 
of the study also are considered. 
The Alternative Procedures 
Essentially, the alternative approaches to the method of 
the study can be classified under one principal heading: 
Multi-objective decision modelling. The problem of satis­
fying domestic and export demands for agricultural commodities, 
and controlling the flow of sediment to the main river basins 
can be interpreted as two goals namely; (a) minimization of 
agricultural production and transhipment costs, and (b) minimi­
zation of the sediment to the river basins. Viewed in this 
light, there are a number of programming techniques which can 
provide the decision-maker with a set of alternatives from 
which an informed decision can be made. Following Cohon and 
Marks [10], these techniques can be classified into three 
groups: (a) generating techniques, (b) techniques which rely 
on the progressive articulation of preferences, and 
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(c) techniques which rely on prior articulation of preferences. 
Generating techniques 
Of the generating techniques, the weighting and constraint 
methods are discussed with reference to the problem of the 
study. Consider the following mathematical model: 
Minimize Z(X) = [Z^(X), ZgfX)] (2.1) 
subject g(X) ^  0 (2.2) 
and X > 0 (2.3) 
where 
h and n dimensional vector of production and tranship­
ment activities, 
Z(X) is a 2 dimensional vector of goals, 
Z^(X) is the cost of production and transhipment of 
agricultural commodities, 
ZgfX) is the quantity of sediment reaching the main 
river basins, 
and 
C is the feasible region {g(X)^of) X^O} containing the 
production capabilities, demand requirements and non-
negativity restrictions. 
15 
Case A 
If the minimum of Z(X) = Z*(X) = [Z*(X), Z*(X)] were 
such that ZJ(X) and Z^(X) were separately the minimum values 
of Z^ and Zg respectively for XeC, then the solution of the 
problem would be trivial, and a unique solution would exist. 
However, this case can be eliminated from further consideration 
since the statement of the problem assumed that conventional 
tillage methods resulted in lower costs but increased sediment 
- that is the goals are conflicting. 
Case B 
Given that Case A can be put aside as trivial, then the 
problem becomes a classical vector maximization problem. The 
weighting method of solution as demonstrated by Zadeh [47] 
can be written as the weighted sum of the two goals Z^ and Zgf 
such that the constraints are satisfied. Algebraically: 
2 
Minimize Z(X) = Z w, Z, (X) (2.4) 
k=l ^ ^  
subject to XeC (2.5) 
Wj^>0 (2.6) 
For any set of weights, w = (w^, Wj), a noninferior solu­
tion would be generated, thus for all possible combinations 
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the full noninferior set (NIS)^ would be delineated. In the 
dual objective problem under consideration, one can fix one 
weight (say w^) and parametrically vary the other (Wg) - a 
method proved computationally efficient by Gass and Saaty 
[15]. Alternatively, one can take convex combinations of the 
weights, that is 1 ^  w^ 0 and Wg = 1-w^. Regardless of the 
method of obtaining the NIS, it should be noted that the NIS 
depends critically on the constraint set, C. Thus any 
change (say in export demands) would realize a new NIS. 
The final step of the weighting technique is for the 
decision-maker to choose a single point on the NIS, so that 
society or community utility is maximized. From an economic 
standpoint, such an optimum would occur where the marginal 
rates of substitution among goals along the NIS and the 
^Define: 
(a) as the set containing all solutions of Problem 
Case B less than Z*. 
(b) the set containing all solutions of Problem 
Case B greater than or equal to Z*, and 
(c) as the set containing all solutions of Problem 
Case B, which are incomparable to Z*. 
Then a point on the NIS is defined as any solution of Z* ( x )  
s u c h  t h a t  X e C  a n d  c f ) z  ^  =  ( p .  
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society's indifference curve are equal. This condition 
illustrated in Figure 2.1, where the points A and B represent 
optima, given two demand projections. In the figure, u^ and 
U2 represent two of the set of society's indifference functions 
over goals and Z2 « The direction of greater satisfaction is 
indicated by the arrow. The NIS^ and the NISg are generated 
(Total 
cost) 
Figure 2.1. 
Z2 (sediment) 
Graphical solution of the dual objective 
problem 
^This condition is only necessary, but it also becomes 
sufficient if ufZ^, Zg) and the NIS were concave and convex 
respectively as shown in Figure 2.1. 
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from low and high commodity requirements respectively. 
The above weighting technique has two major advantages: 
(a) it is generally computationally efficient for dual objec­
tive problems, and (b) it provides a wide range of choice for 
decision-making. However, the large size of the constraint 
matrix in this study and the flexibility generally associated 
with size would serve to dampen computational efficiency and 
limit the number of observable points on the NIS. In fact, 
this was demonstrated by Saygideger [29], where cost limitations 
restricted the NIS between gross soil loss and cost of satis­
fying agricultural demands to five points. 
Probably the biggest disadvantage of the technique is the 
subjectivity embodied in decision-making. The technique im­
plies that decision-makers faced with an NIS can choose points 
such as A and B in Figure 2.1. This requires policy-makers 
who are well-informed about preference systems. Also, one can 
argue that the decision on the choice of the optimal point 
after the realization of the NIS further increases sub­
jectivity. 
Another less serious drawback associated with some appli­
cations of the weighting technique is that shadow prices may 
not be readily revealed as in the Boggessetal. [5] model. 
However, they have demonstrated that this problem is readily 
remedied. 
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The constraint technique is similar to the weighting 
method. The two differ only in the procedural steps de­
lineating the NIS. The weighting technique parameterizes 
the weights on the goals in the objective function, while 
the constraint method acts on the constraint set. The 
problem of Case B can be written in terms of a constraint 
problem as follows : 
Minimize (X) (2.7) 
subject to Z2(X) ^  (2.8) 
XeC (2.9) 
where 
is the minimum sediment level required. 
In the above problem, altering the level of would yield 
the NIS, and further analysis then proceeds identical to the 
weighting technique. 
The progressive articulation of preference 
The techniques which require progressive articulation of 
preferences utilize much less information than the weighting 
and constraint methods. They do not delineate the full NIS 
or require any explicit knowledge of the indifference system 
among goals. Instead, the techniques rely on a close rela­
tionship between programmer and decision-maker to iteratively 
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generate the optimal solution. Basically, the solution tech­
nique involves three steps. First, arbitrary weights assumed 
close to the true optimal solution are used to generate a 
point on the NIS. Second, this knowledge is transmitted to 
the decision-maker who indicates the direction of change 
needed. Third, the decision-maker's reaction is used to 
alter the weights, and the second step is repeated until the 
decision-maker is satisfied or some preassigned termination 
point is reached. 
The above techniques are ideal for localized problems 
as in the example discussed by Candler and Boehlje [7] or 
Candler [6]. For the problem of this study, location of 
decision-makers pose difficulty. Further, even if decision­
makers could be located, they may not necessarily agree on the 
directional changes in attaining the optimal solution. 
The prior articulation or preferences 
Among the techniques which rely on prior articulation of 
preferences, goal programming is perhaps the most common and 
is therefore discussed. The technique was introduced by 
Charnes and Cooper [9], and it generally involves linear 
systems.^ It originated to circumvent the unidimensional 
^In some models nonlinear relationships are assumed as 
in the example of Dauer and Krueger [12]. 
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characteristics of linear programming objective functions, 
Lee and Jaaskelainen [24]. 
In goal programming, each goal is given some pre-
assigned target value which the decision-maker hopes to 
achieve. The driving force of the technique is the require­
ment that deviations from these targets be minimized. Thus 
the problem of Case B can be formally written in goal 
programming framework as: 
2 - + 
Minimize E d. + d. (2.10) 
i=l ^ 1 
subject to XeC (2.11) 
Z^(X) + - d^" = T^ for i = 1,2 (2.12) 
and 
di+, di~ >0 for i = 1,2 (2.13) 
where 
d^"*" represents the over achievement of the target, 
that is, cost or sediment less than the target, 
d^" represents the underachievement of the target, that 
is, cost or sediment greater than the target, 
and 
T^ is the target level. 
Goal programming also requires some ordering among goals. 
This ordering is done indirectly by assigning weights to the 
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deviations from targets. These weights may be used to specify 
a cardinal or pre-emptive ordering among goals or subgoals. 
•If a cardinal ordering were specified, the objective function 
of Equation (2.10) would be written as follows: 
2 
Minimize Z P. d.+ + P. d. (2.14) 
i=l 1 1 1 
such that P--"*" 4- P.~ for i = 1,2 (2.15) 
^ ^ 1 
P,+, P." >0 for i = 1,2 (2.16) 
J. J. — 
and 
P^*, P^~ are the weights on the deviations from targets. 
The full problem becomes Equations (2.14), (2.11), (2.12), 
(2.13), (2.15) and (2.16). The solution involves the use of 
L.P. techniques. 
In the case of a pre-emptive ordering, the ranking of 
goals can be represented using the following notation 
Pj >> nP^. This implies a lexicographic ordering among 
goals, for no amount of goal k can substitute for goal j. 
In such a case, tha solution of the problem may involve more 
than one step, ""or example, consider the problem of Case B, 
such that P^ >> nPg, then the solution steps required 
are: 
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(a) Minimize P^d^ (2.17) 
subject to XeC (2.18) 
Zj^(X) + d^"^ - d^~ = (2.19) 
zgfx) + dg"^ - dg- = tg (2.20) 
d d - > 0 (2.21) 
1 1 — 
and 
(b) Minimize ^2^2^ + ^ 2^2~ (2.22) 
subject to XeC (2.23) 
Z^(X) < Z^*(X) (2.24) 
Z2(X) + dg^ - dg- = Tg (2.25) 
dg+f d2~ > 0 (2.26) 
where 
Z-j^*(X) is the minimum value of problem (a). 
One of the biggest drawbacks of goal programming is the 
amount of information required. Decision-makers must be able 
to specify targets on all goals, and state their priority 
weighting among goals in terms of deviations from the 
targets. In terms of the problem of this study, the 
decision-maker may be unable to state specific a priori 
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targets; since both cost and sediment depend critically on 
the policy instrument or alternatively on the constraint set 
C. Further, a statement of priorities among deviations from 
goals is highly subjective, and may therefore have to be 
chosen after comparing the realizations from different 
priority weighting schemes. This increases subjectivity. 
Another drawback of goal programming stems from the 
NIS being blurred. This is because weights are placed on 
deviation rather than to the goals per se. As a result, the 
NIS is unknown, and a goal programming optimal solution may not 
lie on it. Thus extensive sensitivity analysis may be re­
quired to ensure that it does. This can be demonstrated with 
problem Case B. The unknown NIS for problem Case B is con­
structed in Figure 2.2. Now assuming >>' nP2 and the 
targets on cost and sediment to be T^ and T2 respectively, 
then the solution of the goal program would occur at point A 
on the NIS. Similarly, if the target on cost were reduced 
below T^ (say T^ ) , the solution would occur at B on the NIS. 
However, if the target were above T^ (say T^') , then the 
solution to the goal program would occur at point C inside 
the NIS. Since the NIS is unknown, sensitivity analysis in 
this latter case must be undertaken to reach a point such as 
D on the NIS. 
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(Total 
cost) 
Feasible Region 
NJS (unknown) 
T1 ^2 (sediment) 
Figure 2.2. A graphical illustration of goal programming 
solutions 
Standards and prices and the method of the study 
In the three approaches summarized previously, it was 
assumed that the decision-makers can rank goals. This implies 
a preference ordering between (a) production and transhipment 
costs and (b) sediment known to the decision-makers. This 
assumption is, in fact, the most serious drawback of the 
previous methods, and it led to the selection of a different 
approach and the method of the study. 
The method treats sediment as an externality. As a result. 
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the analysis of the problem of the study stems from the 
Pigouvian taxes (subsidies) approach in controlling externali­
ties. In the strict Pigouvian analysis, a tax (subsidy) equal 
to the marginal net social damage (benefit) is placed on the 
externality producing activity to generate an optimal level of 
control, Baumol [2] and Plott [27] . In practical application, 
however, the analysis suffers from two critical problems. 
First, the measurement of marginal net social damage (benefit) 
generally may be difficult. For example, some of the costs 
associated with sediment externalities are psychic and intangible: 
the present and future losses of recreational services prevent 
sanguine cost estimates. Second, there exists the question 
of what is the optimal rate of sediment control? If the 
answer to this question were known, then the optimal tax 
rate could readily be calculated. From a pragmatic stand­
point, however, the optimal rate of sediment discharge is a 
nebulous concept. 
In order to circumvent the above two difficulties, Baumol 
and Oats [3] and Baumol [2] purported a modified version of the 
Pigouvian tax (subsidy) scheme denoted as the method of 
Standards and Prices. Essentially, the method suggests the 
specification of an arbitrary^ tolerable standard of effluent, 
1 The word arbitrary is used in the sense that the 
standard is not based on theory, but more so on past obser­
vations and researchers' experience. 
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and the use of the price mechanism, tax (subsidy), to gene­
rate the same standard. The final step involves the adjust­
ment of the standards to iteratively determine the optimal 
prices and standards. The adjustments here are based on 
weighing the benefits and the cost of an alternative standard. 
Evidently, the greatest drawback of this procedure is in 
the specification of the tolerable sediment level as is the 
case in this study. Yet, this is less subjective than an 
implicit or actual delineation of a set of preference 
orderings over costs and sediment as in the previous methods. 
Also, the Standards and Prices method provides two policies 
for comparison (a) the standard as given by a regulation and 
(b) the price mechanism consistent with a tax (subsidy). 
In this study, the 5 Ton Limit was the regulation 
specifying the sediment standard. A tax on sediment was 
the relevant policy instrument in generating the standard. 
A Theoretical Comparison of the 
Policies of the Study 
This section investigates the effects of the Tax 
and 5 Ton Limit policies in meeting commodity requirements 
and in generating the same national sediment control in terms 
of: (a) total social cost, and (b) conservation practices. 
These comparisons are made with the implicit assumption of 
equal enforcement cost. Total social cost influences shadow 
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prices of commodities, consumer food bill and the competitive­
ness of U.S. farm exports. Conservation practices are indi­
cative of soil loss, and may reflect regional changes in agri­
cultural production. 
Total social cost 
The Tax yields a lower total social cost than the 
5 Ton Limit in satisfying commodity requirements and attaining 
any given sediment standard. This can be shown by considering 
the following simplistic model^. In the model, there are two 
farm firms producing a predetermined level of commodities 
using two factors of production, land and an aggregate of the 
other factors. Further assume that land produces a negative 
externality, sediment, which does not influence the pro­
duction of commodities; then if a tax were used to control 
sediment, the total social cost would be defined as: 
TC = + W2(X^2+X22) t.s(X;j^j^ (2.27) 
where 
TC is the total social cost of production, 
j is the use of factor i by farm firm j, for 
i/j = 1/2, 
is the variable cost of using factor i and is assumed 
the same for all firms, 
^The model is kept simple to illuminate some of the eco­
nomic properties. Extension of the model to n firm and m 
factors would yield the same results. 
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S is a function relating sediment to land use, and t 
is the tax on sediment. 
Also, the total quantity of commodities produced by the two 
farm firms is given by Equation (2.28). 
f(%ll'%2l) g(xi2,x22) " q (2.28) 
i 
where 
f and g are the production functions for the two firms, 
and 
Q ië the! predetermined level of commodities. 
Now the least cost way of attaining the output is obtained 
by minimizing the right-hand side of Equation (2.27) subject 
to Equation (2.28). This minimization is equivalent to the 
Tax. For the moment, add Equation (2.29)^ which requires 
that a certain amount of sediment be produced. 
S(Xii,Xi2) = S (2.29) 
where 
S is a given standard of sediment. 
After introducing Lagrangian variables and X2, for 
the two constraints of Equations (2.28) and (2.29), one can 
write the following: 
^The equation is used to calculate the marginal cost 
of sediment. It is suppressed later. 
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Minimize L = Wi[Xil+Xl2] + 
+ ^1 [q-j^~f (x^^,x2i) - g(xj^2/x22)] 
+ XgtS-SfXiifXig)]. (2.30) 
For an interior solution to the problem above, the first 
order conditions^ are: 
1. - ^ 1^1 - ^ 2^1 = 0^ (2.31) 
11 
2. + ts^ - - X2S2 = 0 (2.32) 
3. = W2 - Xnf, = 0 (2.33) 
<3..2i ^ 
âr = *2 " ^1^2 = 0 (2.34) 
3*22 
5. 1^ = Q - f(Xii,X2i) - 9(Xi2'%22) = ° (2.35) 
6. 1^ = S - S(X^i,Xi2) = 0 (2.36) 
^The conditions are only necessary, thus sufficiency is 
assumed. 
implies the partial derivative of function H with 
respect to the ith variable of the function. 
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Combining Equations (2.35) and (2.34) yield ~ 
which implies that the ratio of the marginal productivities 
of the second factor should be equated across firms. Also, 
one can write the marginal cost of producing commodities, 
in a form specified by Equation (2.37). Combining 
Equations (2.31) and (2.32) yields Equation (2.38). 
w-i wo 
( f 1 —gi ) 
^2 '2.38) 
Now suppose S was such that the sediment constraint 
of Equation (2.29) was just satisfied,^ then Xg# the marginal 
cost of sediment would be exactly zero. This condition im­
plies that the minimum tax, t*, required to minimize the 
total social cost of satisfying the predetermined commodity 
demand is given by Equation (2.39). 
" • 
Now if the 5 Ton Limit were used to generate the sedi­
ment standard S, the tax on sediment would be set equal to 
zero. Hence, one can conclude that the 5 Ton Limit would 
yield the same total social cost as the Tax under the 
This condition renders the constraint Equation (2.29) 
redundant. Thus a tax of t*, with or without Equation (2.29), 
is analogous to the Tax policy. 
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following conditions: if (a) the 5 Ton Limit's marginal cost 
in producing commodities were given by Equation (2.37) , and 
(b) its marginal cost of sediment were identical to Xg in 
Equation (2.40). Any deviations from these two conditions 
would result in a higher total social cost. In general, the 
above conditions would not hold. Thus the 5 Ton Limit would 
result in a greater total social cost than the Tax. The 
theoretical implication, therefore, is that the 5 Ton Limit 
policy would result in greater shadow prices and food costs, 
and a reduction in the competitiveness of U.S. exports rela­
tive to the Tax policy. 
wp (fn-gj 
Conservation practices 
One implication from the previous model is that with 
the Tax policy (Xg^O)' the optimal allocation of land is 
given by Equation (2.41) . This equat.?.on states that the 
ratio between firms of the sums of: (a) the marginal cost 
of using land and, (b) the marginal cost of land induced 
by the tax on sediments should be equal to the ratio of the 
marginal productivity of land in commodity production. 
This result is crucial in delineating the effect of the Tax 
policy on conservation practices. 
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Assuming the model, consider the case where one farm 
firm was pursuing a higher cost, more soil conserving tech­
nique. Then Equation (2.41) becomes 
• c 
where 
"i ^ "i-
is the variable cost of land for the more soil 
conserving technique, 
and 
g becomes the production function of the farm firm 
pursuing the more soil conserving technique. 
Now from Equation (2.42), it seems that the Tax policy can 
lead to more conservation practices (X^g)f no change, or 
less conservation practices relative to a no policy alterna­
tive as 
(2.43) 
^2 ^ 
This ambiguity stems from the effect of the tax on sediment. 
The tax attempts to equate the marginal rate of substitution 
(MRS) of for X^2 producing sediment to that for 
commodities. Hence, if prior to the tax on sediment (no 
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policy), the relationships were specified as in Equation 
(2.44), then the effect of the tax could be graphically 
illustrated as in Figure 2.3(a)-(c). 
f l i  £ i =  ( 2 . 4 4 )  
^ 9l 
In the figures, the point 'E' represents the no policy 
optimal allocation of and X^2 producing commodities. 
The sediment locus through E, S, shows the combinations of 
and X-^2 which would yield the no policy sediment level. 
In figures 2.3(a)-(b), the MRS of for X^^ pro­
ducing sediment is dra'-m greater (less) than the MRS of X^^ 
for X^2 producing coizimodities. The effect of the Tax 
policy is to move the optimal allocation of X^^ and X^^ to a 
point such as A, where there is more (less) conservation 
(X^g)" It should be noted that in both cases the Tax policy 
reduced sediment, since point A lies below the no policy 
sediment locus. 
There are three possible cases if the no policy resulted 
in equalized marginal rates of substitution for sediment and 
commodities. The cases are shown in Figures 2.3(c)-(e). In 
Figures 2.3(c) and 2.3(d), the Tax policy has no effect in 
reducing sediment, since in the former case the MRSs in pro­
ducing sediment and commodities are identical throughout the 
range; and in the latter case, any reduction in sediment would 
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Figure 2.3. Possible effects of a tax on sediment 
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prevent the commodity requirement from being met. In Figure 
2.3(e), however, the Tax policy reduces sediment by causing 
a movement to A or A' . The direction of the movement would 
depend on size of the tax^ and the shapes of the sediment 
loci. 
In considering the effect of the 5 Ton Limit policy, 
assume: (a) the only variable factor is land,^ and (b) all 
activities must produce less than the 5 tons of gross soil 
loss/acre. The minimization of total social cost can be 
stated as follows: 
Minimize ^l^H + ^ 1^12 (2.45) 
subject to F(Xj^2.'^12^ — Q (2.46) 
H(Xii,XI2) - K < 0 (2.47) 
where 
F is an aggregate function of the two farm firms pro­
duction function, 
H is a function relating average gross soil loss/acre to 
land use, 
K is equal to 5 tons of gross soil loss/acre, and 
^The reason for the disparity between the results of 
Figure 2.3(e) and Equation (2.42) stems from the fact that the 
feasible region became nonconvex (shaded region of Figure 
2.3(e)) after the tax- This renders calculus inappropriate in 
determining the optimal allocation. 
2 This assumption is required to illustrate the results 
graphically. 
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H^>0, H2<0 are assumed to hold. This implies is 
more erosive than (owing to the 
conservation practices on * 
The two possible solutions to the 5 Ton Limit model 
(Equations 2.45-2.47) are illustrated in Figures 2.4(a)-
(b) . It is evident from the figures, that the optimal 
allocation depends on the position of the average gross soil 
loss locus (H). If the locus were as in Figure 2.4(a), the 
no policy allocation of X^i and X^gf (point E), would lie 
outside the 5 Ton Limit's feasible region. As a result, the 
5 Ton Limit policy would cause a movement to a point such as 
A and more conservation (X22)• On the other hand, if the 
no policy locus were as in Figure 2.4(b), the no policy 
optimal allocation of X^^ and X^2 would lie inside the 
5 Ton Limit's feasible region. Hence the 5 Ton Limit would 
have no effect in changing conservation practices. 
The results of the theoretical analysis indicate that 
the effect of the Tax policy in abating sediment depends on 
both regional^ commodity and sediment productivities. The 
Tax policy tries to equate the marginal productivity of sedi­
ment with that for commodities. The 5 Ton Limit policy, on 
the other hand, considers the marginal productivity of 
^Farm firms in the theoretical analysis can also be 
interpreted as regions. 
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Figure 2.4. Possible effects of the 5 Ton Limit policy 
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commodities after conservation practices have effected the 
required gross soil loss/acre. This difference would tend to 
result in more conservation practices and less soil loss with 
5 Ton Limit relative to the Tax in highly erosive and 
productive regions. 
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chapter iii. the model 
The model in this study is an interregional linear pro­
gramming model using conditions consistent with 1985 projec­
tions. The basic model is one in a series developed by the 
Iowa State University - Research Applied to National Needs 
(I.S.U. - RANN) project used to simulate U.S. agriculture. 
The model is set up to minimize the total social cost of 
producing and transporting agricultural commodities, and the 
environmental cost of sedimentation in the main river basins. 
Total social cost is minimized given fixed point demands for 
agricultural commodities. Production is constrained by the 
availability of land resources, water supply, permanent hay 
and nitrogen fertilizer. 
First, a mathematical description of the model is pre­
sented and modifications in accommodating the policy 
alternatives are illustrated. Subsequent discussions include 
the delineation of regions and sectors of the model. 
Mathematical Description of the Model 
In matrix notation, the basic model can be written as 
follows : 
Minimize P + t.S (3.1) 
subject to Cg] [X^ Xg]' - 1P= 0 (3.2) 
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[A^ Ag] [X^ Xg]' > b (3.3) 
[d^ d^] xg] '-is = 0 (3.4) 
p, s, X^,  X2 > 0  (3.5) 
P is a scalar representing the total cost of producing 
and transporting agricultural commodities. 
t is a vector of equal cost 't' on sediment reaching 
the main river basins, 
S is a (kxl) vector of sediment actually reaching the 
main river basins, 
and C2 are (1 x n^) and (1 jc ng) vectors of production 
and transhipment costs, 
A^ and Ag are (m x n^) and (m x Tï.2) matrices of technical 
production and transhipment coefficients, 
b is an (m X 1) vector of resource availabilities and 
demand requirements, 
and D2 are (k x n^) and (k x n2) matrices of 
coefficients delinating the sedimentation process 
from the crop production activities to the main river 
basins, 
I is a (k X k) identity matrix, 
X^ and X2 are the production and transhipment activities. 
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and 
Xg contains all crop production activities with soil 
loss greater than 5 tons/acre annually. 
The basic model specified above was modified in simu­
lating the alternative scenarios. For the Base scenarios, the 
tax "t" on sediment reaching the main river basins was set 
equal to zero. In so doing, the model minimized the total 
cost of producing and transporting agricultural commodities, 
P, without any soil loss or sediment restrictions. With the 
5 Ton Limit, not only was "t" set equal to zero, but all X2 
activities were eliminated. This resulted in the minimization 
of total social cost with the requirement that the soil loss 
from all crop production activities be no more than 5 tons/acre 
annually. The Tax uses the basic model with "t" equal to 
fifty. This implies that total social cost is minimized with 
a tax on sediment and without soil loss restriction on pro­
duction activities. The low and high export scenarios are 
obtained by adjusting the vector "b". 
The value of "t" used in the Tax scenarios was obtained 
from coordinating two approaches. First, the basic model 
was modified as specified by Equations 3.6-3.10. 
Minimize P (3.6) 
subject to [C^ C2][X^ Xg]' - IP = 0 (3.7) 
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a2] [x^ x2] * ^ b (3.8) 
[D^ D2] Xg]' < c (3.9) 
P, X^, Xg > 0 (3.10) 
where 
c is the (k X 1) vector of the 5 Ton Limit's sediment 
reaching the main river basins. 
Simulation of the above model generated k shadow prices 
for sediment actually reaching the main river basins. This 
indicated an initial value of "t". The second step in­
corporates this start value of "t" into the basic model, and 
"t" is iterated until the national sediment with the policy 
alternatives are identical. In so doing, a "t" value of 
fifty was adequate at both export levels. 
Four regional delineations are used in the model. They 
are the regions within which the data are collected, the 
producing areas within which production activities are de­
fined, the market regions which act as a central point of 
commerce and the reporting regions into which the results are 
summarized. 
The Regions of the Model 
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The data regions 
The data were collected from political and geographic 
regions. These regions included the counties and states of 
the continental United States from which census and com­
modity production data were tabulated. In addition, data 
were obtained from the county approximations of the major 
land resource areas as delineated by the data collecting 
agency of the Soil Conservation Services (S.C.S.), U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. Figure 3.1 shows the location 
of these regions within the U.S. 
The data obtained from these diverse regions were then 
altered by a set of relevant weights and summarized into a 
set of homogenous resource or producing areas (PAs). 
The producing areas 
There are 105 producing areas defined in the model. 
They are county aggregations of river subbasins as provided 
by the Water Resource Council for developing the 1975 National 
Assessment of Water Resources [39]. It should be noted that 
the PAs are hydrologically consistent in terms of water flow 
since they are subsectors of larger river basins which can be 
approximated by linking contiguous PAs. Figure 3.2 shows the 
105 PAs nested within the river basins. The heaver lines 
demarcate the major river basins. 
All crop production activities are defined within the PAs. 
Figure 3.1. The SCS data collection areas 
Figure 3.2. The 105 producing areas nested within the main river basins 
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Thus the relevant inputs such as the land base and the water 
supply used in these production processes are also defined 
on a PA basis. 
The market regions 
Twenty-eight contiguous market regions (MRs) are defined 
in the model (Figure 3.3). These are obtained from aggrega­
tion of the 105 PAs. The MRs serve two purposes. First, they 
are the demand regions for the major commodities, and there­
fore, represent the spatial complement of the model through 
which intermediate and final products are shipped. The metro­
politan centre identified within each MR acts as a hub for 
these processes. It is through the spatial linkages that the 
relative comparative advantages and changes in production 
patterns are determined among the regions of the model in ful­
filling the demand restraints. 
Second, the endogenous livestock and relatively immobile 
crop producing activities are defined in these market regions. 
Computational ease is the main reason for defining these 
activities by MRs rather than by PAs. 
The reporting regions 
The reporting regions are shown in Figure 3.4. These are 
more or less arbitrarily assigned on the basis of regional 
importance and convenience. 
ittsburgh 3 •/Baltimore 
Amarilla Charleston Memphis 
San 
Antonio 
Figure 3.3. The 28 market regions with central cities indicated 
NORTHWEST 
GREAT PLAINS 
SOUTHWEST 
SOUTH CENTRAL 
Figure 3.4. The 7 reporting regions 
NORTH 
'ATLANTIC' 
NORTH CENTRAL vo 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
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Major Sectors of the Model 
The model can be subdivided into seven major sectors in 
order to facilitate a more detailed description. These 
include the land, crop production, soil loss and sediment, 
livestock, water supply, commodity demand and transportation 
sectors. Implicitly, there exists another sector - the 
exogenous agricultural sector; for if the model were to simu­
late U.S. agriculture, it should account for all commercial 
agricultural commodities. The exogenous agricultural sector 
accounts for the resource utilization by the nonendogenous 
crops and livestock activities. Some detail of this sector is 
given before discussing the above seven major sectors. 
The exogenous agricultural sector 
The exogenous enterprises can be divided into two groups: 
(a) fruits and vegetables and minor crops, and (b) the small, 
extremely intensive animal enterprises. The first group in­
cludes dry beans, dry peas, flax seed, fruits and nuts, 
peanuts, potatoes, rice, rye, sugar cane, sweet potatoes, 
tobacco and other crops. The second contains broilers, eggs, 
turkeys, sheep and lambs, and other minor animals (horses, 
mules, ducks, geese, fur bearing animals and zoo animals). 
The exogenous activities exert their influence on the 
model through the a priori withdrawals of resources and in 
the case of the animals, also via the nitrogen fertilizer 
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provided. The commodity demands for the exogenous crops are 
determined from historical projection for the year 1985. Once 
these demands are known, the land acreage, water supply and 
nitrogen fertilizer necessary to support them are removed 
from the resource base. In the case of land, some minor ad­
justments are necessary, Nicol et al. [26], to account for 
double cropping which reduces the available exogenous 
acreage. The resources are removed by PA. 
The exogenous livestock activities consume water re­
sources and nutrients. The water resources represent a with­
drawal from the base, and the nutrients are extracted through 
feed which represents an addition to the endogenous demands. 
The feed demands are determined by the rations outlined by 
class of animal in Agricultural Water Needs [17], and the 
projected 1985 number of animals. The nitrogen waste comple­
ment from producing these animals are converted to nitrogen 
fertilizer equivalents and serve as additions to the avail-
cible nitrogen. 
Also included as exogenous crop activities are 
permanent nonleguminous hay and pasture which are converted 
into hay equivalents and are available to the endogenous 
livestock activities on a MR basis as a source of roughage. 
The nonleguminous hay and pasture are determined from 
Conservation Needs Inventory (C.N.I.) [37]. They include range 
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and grazes forest lands. Federal land leased for grazing by 
the Bureau of Land Management and Forest Services is also 
incorporated. 
Land sector 
The land base in the model was developed using data from 
the C.N.I. [37]. The C.N.I., using a two percent sample, 
estimated the number of privately owned land by agricultural 
capability class. The report delineated 8 major classes 
(I-VIII). These classes were further subdivided into 29 
subclasses on the basis of severe hazards restricting use. 
The hazards or subclasses reflected the susceptibility to 
erosion (e), subsoil exposure (s), drainage problems (w), 
and climatic factors preventing normal crop growth (c). 
The land acreages were aggregated by county and class -
subclass into the PAs where the adjustments were made to re­
move the land requirements for exogenous crop use. For this 
model, the land classes were aggregated further into 5 
(dry and irrigated) groups. 
Table 3.1 reports the class - subclass delineation 
within a group and the national land base for each group. 
The crop production sector 
In the endogenous crop production sector, technically 
efficient activities are defined in the production of the 
following crops; barley, oats, wheat, corn, legume and 
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Table 3.1. Five land groups (classes) and their respective 
national endogenous land base 
Total Endogenous 
Groups Class-Subclass acres (000 acres) 
1 I, Ilwa, Illwe 65,084 
2 rest of II, and IV; all of V 213,287 
3 Ille 71,113 
4 IVe 29,642 
5 VI, VII, VIII 14,466 
nonlegume hays, and sugarbeets. Activities are defined on 
each land class in every PA. These activities may consist 
of one to four crops in rotational combination for periods 
of one to eight years. Two complements of every production 
activity are: one of four conservation methods (straight 
row cropping, contouring, strip cropping and terracing), and 
one of three tillage practices (conventional tillage residue 
removed, conventional tillage residue left, and minimum 
tillage). The rotational combinations used in delineating 
each activity were based on historical patterns, while the 
conservation methods and tillage practices were recommenda­
tions obtained from the Soil Conservation Services (S.C.S.) 
questionnaire [25]. 
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Production activities show how the resources of land, 
water and nitrogen fertilizer combine in the production 
of crops, crop aftermaths and soil loss. Production costs 
are also associated with every production activity. 
Production activities are based on a unit acre of land. 
The water coefficients represent the net of precipitation re­
quired for the sustenance of crop yields and are, therefore, 
relevant in the 17 western states where irrigated cropping 
methods are defined. Nitrogen fertilizer requirements 
depend on the crop yields and the rotational combination 
used. Larger crop yields require larger nitrogen use. The 
nitrogen fertilizer adjustments made for rotational se­
quences involve leguminous crops which need less supple­
mentary nitrogen. Yields were obtained from modifications of 
production functions developed by Stoecker [31]. These yields 
are historical projections for 1985 and vary by land class, 
PA, cropping method (dryland or irrigated), tillage and con­
servation practices, and the rotational delineation. 
Apart from cotton and soybeans, the production of each 
crop is associated with an estimate of aftermath in terms of 
hay equivalents. The aftermath yields are modifications 
of Jennings estimates [21]. 
The production costs defined for each activity were 
developed from Eyvindson [13] with adjustments to reflect 
55 
1985 conditions. Eyvindson developed a number of crop 
budgets for both dryland and irrigated crops. These costs 
depend on the crop yields, and therefore, on the variables 
previously delineated, which influence yields. These costs 
do not reflect returns to land or any fixed costs associated 
with land. 
Soil loss and sediment sector 
This sector can be divided into two component parts, 
namely, the gross soil loss and the sediment subsectors. The 
latter defines the quantity of gross soil loss actually 
reaching the main river basins. 
Gross soil loss subsector Gross soil loss represents 
the average annual soil loss leaving the land and emanating 
from the production activities. The study is not concerned 
with gross soil loss per se. However, it is used in an 
accounting sense to determine total and average gross soil 
loss/acre; to identify activities with greater than 5 ton 
gross soil loss, and as a basis to calculate the sediment 
actually reaching the major river basins. 
Gross soil loss estimates were determined in two separate 
ways. For areas east of the Rocky Mountains, the "Universal 
Soil Loss Equation" as outlined by Wischmeier and Smith [46] 
was used. The equation relates average annual soil loss in 
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tons/acre as a multiplicative function of erosivity, erodi-
bility, slope length, slope gradient, crop management prac­
tices and erosion control practices. It states the follow­
ing: 
A  =  R x K x L x S x C x P  ( 3 . 1 1 )  
where 
A is the average annual gross soil loss in tons/acre, 
R is the average rainfall erosive index per year, 
K is the soil erodibility factor, 
L is the slope length, 
S is the slope gradient, 
C is the cropping management factor which hinges upon 
the particular cropping sequence and tillage practices, 
and 
P is the erosion control factor (practice) which depends 
upon the soil conservation practices used. 
The alternative procedure used in computing gross soil 
loss estimates was based on data collected from the S.C.S. 
questionnaire. The data areas for this procedure included 
the agricultural lands in the Mountain valleys and the West 
coast. The tacit assumption of consistency between the 
"Universal Soil Loss" and the S.C.S. estimates is necessary. 
This guarantees usage of both estimates in an accounting 
sense. In fact, the assumption becomes inevitable in areas 
where the two estimation procedures overlap. 
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Sediment sxibsector Not all sediment leaving agri-=~ 
cultural lands reaches the main body of water. There are in­
efficiencies in the movement of soil particles caused by 
natural and artificial entrapments. These structures, whether 
they are highways, streams or grasslands, restrict the move­
ment of soil particles thereby reducing the proportion 
actually reaching the mainstreams. It is this latter propor­
tion which may be responsible for navigational hazards, eutro-
phication and other negative environmental externalities. 
Wade [43] has made estimates of the sediment delivery and 
transport ratios by PA. These ratios respectively show the 
proportion of sediment reaching the PA mainstream, and the 
distribution of the sedimentation in downstream PAs. Table 
3.2 shows the delivery ratios by PA. These sediment delivery 
estimates were computed by taking the ratio of the average 
annual sediment load after adjusting for sediment transport, 
to the annual gross soil loss. The transport ratios which 
represent the proportion of sediment delivered to a river 
reach from an upstream PA is shown in Table 3.3. For further 
details, see Wade [43]. 
Given the sediment delivery and transport ratios, and 
the schematic river flow (Figure 3.5), then the quantity and 
distribution of sediment deposited in the main river basins 
from any crop production activity can be computed. The pro­
cedure is illustrated as follows: 
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Sediment delivery ratios used in 
(Source; Wade [43] ) 
the model to compute sediment from soil loss 
Sediment Producing Sediment Producing Sediment Producing • Sediment 
Delivery 
Ratio 
Area Delivery 
Ratio 
Area Delivery 
Ratio 
Area Delive: 
Ratio 
.016 28 .03 54 .032 80 .022 
.016 29 .03 55 .032 81 .001 
.041 30 .03 56 .032 82 .064 
.041 31 .064 57 .112 83 .058 
.041 32 .03 58 .037 84 .213 
.04 33 .03 59 .037 85 .077 
.025 34 .185 60 .111 86 .023 
.025 35 .03 61 .074 87 .001 
.012 36 .01 62 .03 88 .01 
.016 37 .01 63 .024 89 .01 
.01 38 .134 64 .032 90 .01 
.008 39 .001 65 .004 91 .01 
.006 40 .028 66 .022 92 .01 
.005 41 .049 67 .01 93 .043 
.004 42 .05 68 .019 94 .01 
.003 43 .05 69 .053 95 .057 
.003 44 .043 70 .006 96 .068 
.002 45 .035 71 .012 97 .01 
.016 46 .258 72 .007 98 .01 
.019 47 .014 73 .081 99 .378 
.012 48 .079 74 .001 100 .021 
.03 49 .074 75 .018 101 .003 
.03 50 .161 76 .008 102 .018 
.03 51 .322 77 .01 103 .107 
.03 52 .003 78 .001 104 .005 
.03 53 .007 79 .059 105 .01 
.03 
ui 
00 
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Table 3.3. Sediment transport ratios used in the model to 
complete sediment deposition from upstream PAs 
(Source: Wade [43]) 
Producing Sediment Producing Sediment 
Area Transport Area Transport 
Ratio Ratio 
8 1.000 59 1.000 
31 .513 60 1.000 
34 .735 63 .270 
38 .001 64 .228 
40 .700 66 .110 
41 .400 68 .067 
42 .540 69 1.000 
43 .950 73 .026 
44 1.000 75 .003 
45 1.000 78 .106 
46 1.000 79 .188 
48 1.000 81 .334 
50 .029 84 .038 
52 .001 86 .016 
53 .838 93 .007 
55 1.000 95 .256 
56 1.000 96 1.000 
57 1.000 
Let 
Dj be the delivery ratio for PA^, 
Tj be the transport ratio for PA^, 
GS^j be the gross soil loss in tons/acre of activity i 
in PAj, and 
F. . = D. X GS.. is the total soil loss in tons/acre 1] ] 1] 
emanating from activity i in PAj actually 
reaching the main river basin associated 
with PA^, 
J 
Figure 3.5. Schematic river flows for sediment transport 
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then there exists coefficients, S.. s', of the form 
13K 
Fij(l-Ti); X Tj^(1-T2); F^j x x Tgfl-Tg); . . . 
F.. X Ti X T? X ... T ,(1-T ), which describe the sedi-1] -L ^ n—1 n 
mentation distribution process for that activity, where 
X  1 , 2 , . . . m ,  
j,k = 1,2,...105, 
m = total number of activities in PA^ , 
n = total number of downstream PA as indicated by the 
river flow system, and 
S^jjç is the quantity of sediment in tons/acre actually 
reaching the river basin in PA^ from activity i in 
PA.. ] 
The final complement of the soil sedimentation subsector 
is à linkage to the objective function independent of pro­
duction costs. This linkage is shown in Equation (3.4). 
In summary, this subsector exhibits two features. First, 
it accounts for the locational differences in sedimentation 
in the sense that the soil loss from a given endogenous pro­
duction activity in any PA (say 45) may be deposited in the 
river basin in another PA (say 46). Second, the independent 
linkage to the objective function increases the computational 
efficiency in evaluating policy alternatives. 
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The livestock sector 
The endogenous livestock activities are defined by market 
regions. They represent four classes of livestock namely 
dairy cows, hogs, beef cows, and beef feeding. Each activity 
is associated with a ration, a direct cost of production, and 
a nitrogen supply coefficient which stems from manure pro­
duction. 
Each type of livestock can choose from a number of rations 
determined endogenous to the model. The rations allow dif­
ferent permutations among crops in producing one unit of 
livestock. Substitutability among rations can take place among 
grains, between grains and roughages, and among roughages given 
the grain component. Rations are formulated with embedded 
restrictions which guarantee palatability by the livestock 
consuming class. 
Two sets of costs are involved in producing one unit of 
livestock activity. First, the direct cost in the "objective 
function". These costs are derived from Eyvindson with 
adjustments by Meister and Nicol [25] to account for dif­
ferential rates of livestock capital utilization among the 
various market regions. Second, there is an indirect or 
implied cost associated with the shadow prices of the crops 
which define the rations. It should be noted, that given 
identical direct costs, the model chooses the least cost 
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ration in terms of the internal crop prices generated. 
The manure byproduct of livestock enterprises represents 
a possible contribution to nitrogen fertilizer. The model con­
verts livestock manure into nitrogen equivalents and makes it 
available for utilization by the endogenous crop production 
activities. 
Water sector 
The water sector is developed to simulate endogenous water 
usage in the western states where irrigation practices occur. 
In the eastern states, no water activities are required since 
water availability exceeds agricultural demands and generally 
is too costly to use for irrigation. 
Water supplies are defined by PA for PA 48 to PA 105 in­
clusive. The sources of the supplies include surface and 
ground water after adjustments are made for nonagricultural 
requirements and transit losses. The availability of water in 
any given PA depends on the natural flows and interbasin 
transfers from other PAs within specified limits. 
There is also a cost by PA associated with the water flow 
system. These costs are based on the water delivery and 
pumpage charges and are derived from data obtained from the 
Bureau of Reclamation irrigations projects [40]. For further 
details concerning the water sector and the development of 
water prices, see Meister and Nicol [25]. 
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Commodity demand sector 
The demand sector specifies the point demand for each 
commodity at the market region level. This sector is the 
driving force of the model, in the sense that, it states the 
minimum quantity of the endogenous commodities necessary to 
guarantee the 1985 projected consumption of food and fiber, 
net exports, exogenous livestock production, and industrial 
and other nonfood uses. 
Two alternative demand levels are used in the study. These 
demands are based on a national population of 233 million for 
the year 1985. Domestic utilization of commodities are the 
same in both demand scenarios but estimates of the net 
exports are based on the OBERS E' "high" and a deviant of the 
OBERS E' export projections [41, 42]. The low export demand 
is the OBERS E' "high" estimate, while the high export demand 
uses the OBERS E' with a fixed proportionate increase of .486, 
.07, .199 and .245 in corn, sorghum, wheat and soybeans 
respectively to the levels indicated in Table 3.4. It should 
be noted that the high export demand exhibits a bias 
towards row crops - soybeans in particular. 
The transportation sector 
This sector delineates the transhipment network among 
market regions. In general, routes are defined between con­
tiguous market regions. However, in some cases, noncontiguous 
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Table 3.4. Projected 1985 net exports: OBERS E', the low and high 
demêinds used in the 
Item 
OBERS E' 
Export Quantities - Millions 
Unit 
OBERS E' "high" 
(low export 
demand) 
OBERS E' "adj.* 
(high export 
demand) 
Corn bu. 989 
Sorghum bu. 160 
Barley bu. 20 
Oats bu. 10 
Wheat • bu. 774 
Soybeans bu. 950 
Cotton bale 4.1 
Beef & veal lbs. -2,169 
(carc. wt.) 
Milk (fresh lbs. -680 
equiv.) 
Pork (carc. lbs. -307 
wt.) 
Lanû) & mutton lbs. -230 
(carc. wt.) 
Turkeys (R.T.C.) lbs. 70 
Broilers (R.T.C.) lbs. 235 
Eggs doz. 44 
1,889 
270 
25 
19 
1,179 
1,125 
4.2 
-1,190 
—680 
-307 
-230 
70 
235 
43.9 
1,875 
288 
20 
10 
1,137 
1,397 
4.1 
-2,169 
-680 
-307 
-230 
70 
235 
44 
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market region routes are defined if such specifications re­
duce the mileage by more than 10% vis-a-vis the normal routes. 
For every commodity shipped, two routes link each pair 
of market regions. This facilitates the movement of the 
commodity in both directions. 
Transhipment costs are associated with the movement of 
each commodity- These costs are proportional to the distance 
between market regions, since a uniform rate is charged over 
all routes, given the commodity. 
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CHAPTER IV. RESULTS 
In this chapter, the results of the study are presented. 
First the two Base scenarios are compared; then similar com­
parisons are discussed for the policy alternatives using the 
Base scenarios as reference points. For example, the low 
export Base scenario would represent the relevant Base for 
comparing the low export Tax and 5 Ton Limit scenarios except 
if otherwise specified. The variables discussed are the 
environmental impacts, conservation and tillage practices, re­
source utilization, land rents, crop and livestock production 
patterns, regional agricultural importance, and changes in 
shadow prices and domestic food cost per capita. 
The Environmental Impacts 
The main environmental variable considered is sediment, 
although gross loss and average gross soil loss/acre are 
introduced to complete the analysis. National and regional 
changes in sediment with Base scenarios are first delineated. 
Then, the effect of the policy scenarios (Tax and 5 Ton Limit) 
are compared. Similar analyses are pursued for the gross soil 
loss. Some observations concerning average gross soil loss/ 
acre are also mentioned. 
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Sediment 
Base scenarios Total sediment for the U.S. was 83 
million tons with the low export Base scenario. Of this 
sediment, 78% was located in the South Atlantic region and 
16% in the combined North and South Central regions (Table 
4.1). The high export Base scenario resulted in an increase 
in the national sediment load to 95 million tons or a 
change of 14.5%. The positive change in sediment with the 
high export Base scenario was common to all regions. The 
South Atlantic, the major region of sedimentation, had the 
largest change - 17%. The Great Plains, Northwest and 
Southwest were the only other regions having significant 
changes which were 15% on the average. 
One reason for the positive changa in sediment with the 
high export Base was the increase in land use required to 
satisfy the commodity demands. Greater land use implies 
greater sediment. Also, the increase in land use occurred 
primarily on the more erosive land classes further aiding 
sedimentation. This was the main reason for the large changes 
in sediment in the South Atlantic, Great Plains and Western 
regions. 
The high export favored the production of more row 
crops (particularly soybeans) relative to small grains. This 
also encouraged the positive sediment change. 
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Policy scenarios Independent of the export level, the 
two policy alternatives resulted in similar reductions in the 
total U.S. sediment relative to the Base scenarios. At the 
low export level, the Tax generated a 65% reduction in sedi­
ment compared to 63% for the 5 Ton Limit, and at the high 
export level these percentages were reversed (Tables 4.1). 
The similarity between the two policies on sediment at 
the national level was not transmitted throughout the 
regions. In the North Atlantic and South Central regions, the 
5 Ton Limit policy was more effective in reducing sediment 
than the Tax policy, and in the Great Plains, Northwest and 
Southwest, the opposite was true. 
The close mapping of the two policies on national sediment 
was expected, given the construction of the Tax policy. The 
effectiveness of the 5 Ton Limit was linked to regional ero-
sivity. The later encouraged soil conserving techniques in 
the erosive regions, hence its effectiveness in abating sedi­
ment in the North Atlantic and South Central regions. In 
the case of the Tax policy, the tax on sediment was not very 
effective in introducing soil conserving techniques in the 
more productive regions. As a result, the Tax policy was not 
very effective in the North Atlantic and South Central 
regions. 
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Table 4.1. Regional sediment loads, and as a percentage of the Base for 
the six scenarios 
Sediment 
Item (000 
tons) 
Low Export 
% of 
Base 
High Export 
(000 
tons) 
% of 
Base 
North Atlantic 
Base 790 
Tax 456 
5 Ton Limit 330 
100 
58 
42 
824 
668 
326 
100 
81 
40 
South Atlantic 
Base 64,998 
Tax 20,731 
5 Ton Limit 21,766 
100 
32 
33 
75,696 
25,177 
23,953 
100 
33 
32 
North Central 
Base 6,950 
Tax 4,434 
5 Ton Limit 4,752 
100 
64 
68 
7,085 
5,015 
4,672 
100 
71 
66 
South Central 
Base 6,300 
Tax 2,257 
5 Ton Limit 1,439 
100 
36 
23 
6,625 
2,619 
1,672 
100 
40 
25 
Great Plains 
Base 2,102 
Tax 446 
5 Ton Limit 1,076 
100 
21 
51 
2,429 
781 
1,169 
100 
32 
48 
Northwest 
Base 1,527 
Tax 676 
5 Ton limit 849 
100 
44 
56 
1,762 
784 
971 
100 
44 
55 
Southwest 
Base 324 
Tax 249 
5 Ton Limit 313 
100 
77 
97 
372 
239 
414 
100 
64 
111 
United States 
Base 82,991 
Tax 29,249 
5 Ton Limit 30,325 
100 
35 
37 
94,793 
35,283 
33,177 
100 
37 
35 
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Gross soil loss 
Base scenarios National gross soil loss under the 
low export Base scenario was 1.9 billion tons (Table 4.2). 
The North Central, South Atlantic, and the combined Great 
Plains and South Central accounted for 35%, 25% and 34% of 
the total respectively. The South Atlantic was by far the 
most erosive. Gross soil loss/acre for that region was 
12.06 tons - a value which was more than double any other 
region (Table 4.2). 
The high export Base scenario increased national gross 
soil loss by 7% in comparison with the low export Base. The 
main regional increases occurred in the South Atlantic and 
Northwest. The changes were 13% and 12% respectively. 
There are a number of factors which cause increases in 
gross soil loss at the high export level. First, as 
previously mentioned, the increases in land use and the 
greater production of erosive crops encourage gross soil 
loss. Second, increases in demand for land causes land 
values to rise. As a result, the relative cost of conserva­
tion practices to land values may decline. This effect induces 
soil conserving practices and decreases gross soil loss - a 
ftegative effect." Third, the high export level can alter the 
comparative advantage aimong regions, cause substitution among 
crops and so affect regional gross soil loss. 
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Table 4.2. Regional gross soil loss, and as a percentage of the 
Base, and average gross soil loss/acre for all scenarios 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
Gross Soil Loss 
Low Export 
(000 
tons) 
North Atlantic 
65,797 
37,224 
29,256 
% of 
Base 
100 
57 
44 
High Export 
Av. Gross Soil 
tons/acre 
(000 
tons) 
% of 
Base 
Low 
Export 
65,042 
55,704 
28,082 
100 
86 
43 
5.82 
3.29 
2.61 
High 
Export 
5.48 
4.78 
2.45 
South Atlantic 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
469,666 
368,264 
133,648 
100 
78 
28 
530,394 
382,387 
147,236 
100 
72 
28 
12.06 
9.97 
3.58 
12.64 
9.60 
3.58 
North Central 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
649,099 
440,984 
372,304 
100 
68 
57 
694,271 
463,903 
403,790 
100 
67 
58 
4.86 
3.28 
2.74 
5.03 
3.36 
2.89 
South Central 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
291,616 
187,538 
114,487 
100 
64 
39 
292,244 
202,621 
133,311 
100 
69 
46 
5.17 
3.14 
2.00 
4.73 
3.31 
2.14 
Great Plains 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
345,272 
81,765 
133,170 
100 
24 
39 
363,697 
102,850 
143,984 
100 
28 
40 
5.20 
1.30 
2 .22  
4.80 
1.37 
1.84 
Northwest 
Base 39,063 
Tax 21,052 
5 Ton Limit 22,819 
Southwest 
Base 12,414 
Tax 9,133 
5 Ton limit 10,787 
100 
54 
58 
100 
74 
87 
43,882 
27,025 
24,600 
12,540 
9,544 
9,338 
100 
62 
56 
100 
76 
74 
2.95 
1.65 
1.79 
Y 
1.36 
1.03 
1.16 
3.17 
2.09 
1.67 
1.26 
0.96 
0.87 
United States 
Base 1,872,929 100 2,002,013 100 5.69 5.60 
Tax 1,145,963 61 1,244,038 62 3.56 3.57 
5 Ton Limit 816,475 44 890,343 44 2.45 2.48 
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The results confirmed the presence of the negative ef­
fect, but it was insignificant. The effect was manifested 
in the North Atlantic region where changes in conservation 
practices caused both gross soil loss and gross soil loss/ 
acre to decline. In the North Central, South Central, Great 
Plains and Southwest, gross soil loss/acre declined, but it 
was difficult to separate the influence of the "negative 
effect" from substitution among crops. In the South At­
lantic and the Northwest regions, gross soil loss/acre in­
creased because of greater utilization of more erosive lands 
and increased row crop production. 
Policy scenarios The 5 Ton Limit proved to be sig­
nificantly more effective in reducing gross soil loss than 
the Tax at the assumed tax level. At both export levels, the 
5 Ton Limit reduced the national gross soil loss by 56% 
relative to the Base scenarios. The corresponding reductions 
with the Tax were approximately 39%. Regionally, the 5 Ton 
Limit was more effective than the Tax in reducing soil loss 
in the Atlantic and South Central. However, the opposite was 
true in the Great Plains, and to a lesser extent in the 
Western regions (Table 4.2). 
The overall greater effectiveness of the 5 Ton Limit 
policy on soil loss was manifested in the national average 
gross soil loss/acre. The 5 Ton Limit generated a national 
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average gross soil loss/acre of 2.5 tons compared with 3.6 
for the Tax. These averages were considerably below the 
Base scenario national average of 5.65 tons/acre. 
The main reasons for the disparity between the 5 Ton 
Limit and the Tax on soil loss were: (a) the relative in­
effectiveness of the tax on sediment in inducing conserva­
tion practices in highly productive regions, and (b) the 
5 Ton Limit's restriction on gross soil loss regardless of 
productivity. These influences were particularly evident 
in the Atlantic regions where the disparity between the two 
policies on both gross soil loss and average gross soil 
loss/acre was extremely large. 
Conservation and Tillage 
Practices 
Conservation and tillage practices are two important 
variables which determine the quantity of gross soil loss and 
therefore sediment. This section focuses on the patterns of 
conservation and tillage practices with the Base scenarios, 
and the changes in these patterns resulting from the use of 
the policy alternatives. The national distribution of 
conservation and tillage practices are first compared among 
all scenarios, then similar comparisons are made for the 
North Atlantic, South Atlantic, South Central and Great 
Plains; regions where the policy scenarios showed wide 
75 
disparities in gross soil loss. 
National conservation and tillage practices 
The national conservation and tillage practices with 
Base scenarios are first compared. The effect of the policy 
scenarios are then investigated using the Base scenarios as 
reference points. 
Base scenario National conservation and tillage 
practices were only slightly altered from the low to the 
high export Base (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Contouring and 
straight row cropping were the dominant conservation prac­
tices, despite slight reductions in both under the high 
export Base. 
Policy scenarios Independent of the export levels, 
the policy alternatives resulted in decreases in the rela­
tive proportions of straight row and strip cropping, and 
increases in contouring and terracing with respect to the 
Base scenarios (Table 4.3). Terracing changed the most 
among the land management practices. For example, at the 
low export level, the Tax and the 5 Ton Limit resulted in 
14.8% and 16.2% of terracing respectively compared to the 
Base scenario's 7.4%. At the high export level, the per­
centages of terraced acres were 19.3% and 20.4% for the 
Tax and 5 Ton Limit respectively compared with 11.1% for the 
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Table 4.3. The national percentage distribution of land 
management practices for all scenarios 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Straight row 34.6 28.6 25.2 33.5 26.6 24.4 
Contouring 49.4 51.0 52.8 46.4 48.5 50.6 
Strip cropping 8.6 5.6 5.8 9.0 5.6 4.6 
Terracing 7.4 14.8 16.2 11.1 19.3 20.4 
Table 4.4. The national percentage distribution of tillage 
practices for all scenarios 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit Limit 
Con RR 17.1 15.1 15.6 17.5 14.9 17.6 
Con RL 48.8 44.6 38.2 47.8 44.8 33.9 
Minimum tillage 34.1 40.3 46.2 34.7 40.3 48.5 
Base. 
Compared with the Base scenario, the policy scenarios 
showed a definite swing toward more minimum tillage. The 
shift was more pronounced with the 5 Ton Limit than with the 
Tax as indicated in Table 4.4. 
Changes in terracing and minimum tillage were the key 
77 
variables influencing the decline in soil loss with the 
policy scenarios. Minimum tillage was the more effective 
variable^ since the 5 Ton Limit had a lower soil loss than 
the Tax, and the main divergence between the two policies 
in terms of soil conservation was the difference in minimum 
tillage. 
North Atlantic conservation and tillage practices 
Base scenarios A comparison of the North Atlantic 
region's conservation practices with the Base scenarios 
indicated that the high export level involved a greater per­
centage of terracing and a lower percentage straight row 
cropping than the low export level (Table 4.5). With 
tillage practices, Table 4.6 shows that the high export Base 
resulted in increased minimum tillage and decreased conven­
tional till residue left (Con RL) relative to the low export 
Base. 
Recalling that in the above region the high export Base 
generated reductions in both gross soil loss and gross soil 
loss/acre relative to the low export Base, then the rela­
tively large change in terracing and minimum tillage were 
evidently causal variables. 
lit should be noted that it is not quite correct to 
separate the effects of terracing and minimum tillage since 
their joint combination was very effective in reducing soil 
loss. 
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Table 4.5. The North Atlantic percentage distribution of 
land management practices for all scenarios 
Low Export High Expo Ft 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Straight row 31.1 
00 1—1 
14.1 26.2 19.8 16.5 
Contouring 60.2 60.6 60.9 57.4 58.8 59.6 
Strip cropping 7.6 12.0 12.2 7.8 12.7 11.4 
Terracing 1.1 9.0 12.8 8.6 8.7 12.5 
Table 4.6. The North Atlantic percentage distribution of 
tillage practices for all scenarios 
Low Export High Expor"t 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit Limit 
Con RR 14.6 12.3 11.5 14.1 13.1 14.1 
Con RL 34.2 26.4 27.9 28.6 43.4 28.8 
Minimum tillage 51.2 61.3 60.6 57.3 43.4 57.1 
Policy scenarios The policy alternatives resulted 
in increases in terracing and strip cropping, and de­
creases in straight row cropping relative to the Base 
scenarios. The 5 Ton Limit policy was more effective than 
the Tax policy in influencing the above changes as seen 
in the disparities of straight row cropping and terracing 
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(Table 4.5). 
On tillage practices, the policy scenarios had two 
separate effects depending on the export level. At the 
low export level, minimim tillage increased with both poli­
cies relative to the Base, but at the high export level it 
fell relative to the Base (Table 4.6). These tendencies were 
more pronounced with the Tax. One can therefore conclude 
that the Tax policy used less soil restrictive tillage 
practices at the high export level than at the low export 
level; consequently, gross soil loss with the high export 
Tax policy increased considerably (Table 4.2). 
South Atlantic conservation and tillage practices 
Base scenarios The high export Base scenario gene­
rated marginal changes in conservation practices relative to 
the low export Base. Contouring declined, while straight row 
cropping, strip cropping, and terracing increased (Table 4.7). 
In the case of the tillage practices. Table 4.8 shows that 
both Base scenarios were similar. Conventional till residue 
left was the dominant tillage practice accounting for 85% of 
total tillage practices. 
Policy scenarios The policy scenarios resulted in a 
relative reduction in straight row cropping and an increase 
in terracing compared with the Base scenarios. These 
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Table 4.7. The South Atlantic percentage distribution of 
land management percentages for all scenarios 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Straight row 41.2 40.6 39.6 42.2 37.6 28.9 
Contouring 47.7 45.5 47.2 44.6 47.2 55.6 
Strip cropping 9.2 6.4 1.2 8.7 5.6 1.7 
Terracing 1.9 7.5 12.0 4.5 9.6 13.8 
Table 4.8. The South Atlantic percentage distribution of 
tillage practices for all scenarios 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Con RR 4.7 4.3 8.6 3.5 3.1 5.7 
Con RL 85.6 83.2 18.2 84.9 80.2 21.1 
Minimum tillage 9.7 12.5 73.2 11.6 16.7 73.2 
tendencies were more apparent with 5 Ton Limit policy 
(Table 4.7). Terracing had the largest increases among the 
conservation practices. For example, at the low export 
level, the percentages of terracing were 12% and 7.5% with 
the 5 Ton Limit and Tax respectively compared with 1.9% 
for the Base scenario. At the high export level, the 
respective percentages were 13.8% and 9.6% for the 5 Ton Limit 
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and Tax compared with the Base scenario's 4.5%. 
Tillage practices varied considerably with the two 
policy alternatives. The Tax policy tillage practices 
closely mapped the Base scenarios as shown in Tabel 4.8. 
However, the 5 Ton Limit policy resulted in drastic changes 
in the tillage practices favoring the use of minimum tillage. 
Table 4.8 shows that at both export levels approximately 
73.2% of the total acres in the South Atlantic was under 
minimum tillage. This percentage compares with 12.5% and 
16.7% for the,low and high export Tax scenarios respectively, 
and 9.7% and 11.6% for the analogous Base scenarios. 
Since land management practices were not significantly 
different between the two policies, then the differences 
in minimum tillage were clearly the main factors responsible 
for the large disparity in the South Atlantic's gross soil 
loss under the policy scenarios. 
South Central conservation and tillage practices 
Base scenarios The high export Base resulted in in­
creased terracing, but decreased straight row cropping and 
contouring relative to the low export Base. Terraced acres 
had the largest changes (Table 4.9); from 22.7% at the low 
export Base to 28.2% at the high export Base. The changes in 
tillage practices were insignificant (Table 4.10), hence the 
above shift in conservation practices was evidently an 
X, 
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Table 4.9. The South Central percentage distribution of land 
management percentages for all scenarios 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit Limit 
Straight row 49.2 37.3 22.0 45.9 32.3 21.4 
Contouring 28.1 34.6 50.4 25.9 34.9 47.4 
Strip cropping - 1.3 1.4 - 1.2 
Terracing 22.7 26.8 26.2 28.2 31.6 31.2 
Table 4.10. The South Central percentage distribution of 
tillage practices for all scenarios 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit Limit 
29.2 25.8 28.2 28.7 29.9 
69.1 65.6 70.3 66.4 56.9 
1.7 8.6 1.5 4.9 13.2 
Con RR 28.2 
Con RL 71.8 
Minimum tillage -
underlying factor manifested in the marginal increase in 
the South Central's high export Base gross soil loss. 
Policy scenarios Independent of the export level, 
the policy alternatives generated shifts in conservation 
practices, relative to the Base scenarios, away from 
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straight row cropping and toward increased contouring and 
terracing (Table 4.9). Both policy alternatives had similar 
proportions of terraced acres, but straight row cropping and 
contouring differed substantially. At both export levels, 
the 5 Ton Limit had much lower percentages of straight row 
cropping and greater proportions of contour cropping than 
the Tax (Table 4.9). 
Tillage practices with the policy alternatives tended 
toward greater minimum tillage and less conventional till 
residue left vis-a-vis the Base scenarios (Table 4.10). 
Although the directional changes in tillage practices were 
similar for the two policies, the magnitude of the shifts 
were significantly different. The Tax policy caused small 
changes in the tillage practices, but the 5 Ton Limit ef­
fected substantial changes in minimum tillage and con­
ventional tillage residue left (Table 4.10). 
Recalling that in the South Central region, the Tax 
reduced the Base scenarios gross soil loss and sediment by 
considerably less than the 5 Ton Limit, then the rigidity 
of straight row cropping with the Tax policy, and the in­
ability of the policy to significantly introduce minimum 
tillage were factors aiding the disparity. 
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Great Plains conservation and tillage practices 
Base scenarios The main differences between the 
conservation practices with the low and high export Base 
scenarios were in contour cropping and terracing. Contour 
cropping fell from 51.1% at the low export Base to 45.3% with 
the high, while terraced acres increased from 15.4% to 20.5% 
(Table 4.11). In the case of tillage practices, tiie changes 
under the high export Base relative to its low export counter­
part, was away from conventional till residue left to more 
minimum tillage•(Table 4.12). The greater use of terracing 
and minimum tillage with the high export Base dampened the 
increase in gross soil loss in the Great Plains. The re­
duction in gross soil loss per acre from 5.2 tons at the 
low export Base to 4.8 tons per acre at the high demonstrated 
the dampening effect. 
Policy scenarios There were no real differences in 
conservation practices between the two policy alternatives. 
However, compared to the Base scenarios, the policy alterna^ 
tives resulted in large reductions in the percentage of 
straight row cropping and strip cropping, and substantial 
increases in the percentage of terracing (Table 4.11). 
In the case of tillage practices, comparison of the 
policy alternatives vis-a-vis the Base scenarios, indicated 
that under the former, the proportions of minimum tillage 
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Table 4.11. The Great Plains percentage distribution of land 
management practices for all scenarios 
Low Export High Expor"t 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Straight row 21.5 14.0 12.9 21.6 12.3 13.8 
Contouring 51.1 53.0 49.1 45.3 45.6 43.9 
Strip cropping 12.0 3.7 5.8 12.6 4.8 5.1 
Terracing 15.4 29.3 32.2 20.5 37.3 37.2 
Table 4.12. The Great Plains percentage distribution of 
tillage practices for all scenarios 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit Limit 
Con RR 20.0 11.8 13.9 19.0 8.5 13.1 
Con RL 72.8 63.1 69.2 67.9 61.7 57.5 
Minimum tillage 7.2 25.1 16.9 13.1 29.8 29.5 
were greater, while the percentages of conventional tillages 
were lower (Table 4.12). The Tax was more effective than the 
5 Ton Limit in introducing soil conserving tillage prac­
tices. This tendency was very apparent at the low export 
level where the Tax generated a greater proportion of minimum 
tillage and lower percentages of conventional tillages. At 
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the high export level, the two policies had similar pro­
portions of minimum tillage, but the Tax was again more ef­
fective in implementing soil conserving tillage practices. 
This is obvious from Table 4.12 which shows that the Tax had 
a greater proportion of conventional till residue left and a 
lower proportion of conventional till residue removed (Con 
RR) than the 5 Ton Limit. 
In the Great Plains, the Tax reduced soil loss and sedi­
ment by more than the 5 Ton Limit. The above analysis indi­
cates that tillage practices aided this effect. 
Summary 
In summary, one can conclude that national conserva­
tion and tillage practices were relatively unaltered under 
the Base scenarios. The high export Base scenario resulted 
in marginal increases in terracing relative to the low ex­
port Base. This served to dampen soil loss and sediment 
increases under the former. An effect which was quite pro­
nounced in the North Atlantic region. 
The policy scenarios increased both conservation and 
tillage practices relative to the Base scenarios. Increases 
in terracing, and minimum tillage in particular, were 
prominent among the regions. The Tax had less effect in 
inducing soil conserving practices than the 5 Ton Limit. 
This was very evident in the South Atlantic, and to a 
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lesser extent in the North Atlantic and South Central. The 
Great Plains was the main exception. 
Resources used in Crop 
Production 
The resources considered are land, nitrogen and pesti­
cides. National and regional land utilization are compared 
under the six scenarios. Land class utilization is also de­
lineated. With nitrogen and pesticides, both the national 
and regional utilizations are investigated. 
Land utilization 
Land utilization in the absence of absolute resource 
availability says nothing about the national importance of 
any region. However, it is a good measure of relative 
regional comparative advantages; the greater the land utiliza­
tion, the greater the relative comparative advantage. This 
criterion is used to examine the relative regional compara­
tive advantage under the six scenarios. The Base scenarios 
are first compared, then the effects of the policy alterna­
tives are investigated. 
Base scenario With the Base scenarios, the Atlantic 
and North Central regions were at a relative comparative 
advantage. Table 4.13 shows that under the low export 
Base, these regions were the only regions which had greater 
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Table 4.13. 
Item 
Percentage utilization of total cropland 
(exogenous and endogenous) by regions: the low 
and high export scenarios 
The Demand Alternatives 
Low Export High Export Change 
North Atlantic 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
94.5 
94.5 
94.0 
98.7 
97.0 
95.8 
4.2 
2.5 
1.8 
South Atlantic 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
90.3 
86.3 
87.1 
96.4 
92.1 
94.6 
6.1 
5.8 
7.5 
North Central 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
94.1 
94.8 
95.6 
97.0 
97.1 
98.2 
2.9 
2.3 
2 . 6  
South Central 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
89.4 
87.0 
90.9 
97.4 
96.5 
98.4 
8 . 0  
9.5 
7.5 
Great Plains 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
81.3 
77.4 
85.6 
92.6 
91.9 
95.5 
11.3 
14.5 
10.1 
Northwest 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
89.0 
86.1 
86.1 
92.6 
87.2 
97.4 
3.6 
1.1 
11.3 
Southwest 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
85.7 
84.3 
87.1 
92.3 
94.6 
97.1 
6.6 
10.3 
10.0 
United States 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
89.6 
87.9 
90.8 
95.8 
94.6 
97.1 
6 . 2  
6.7 
6.3 
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land utilization than the national average. A similar ef­
fect was observed at the high export level, except that the 
competitiveness of the South Central region also increased 
as evidenced by its land utilization (Table 4.13). 
National land utilization with the Base scenarios in­
creased from 39.6% at the low export level to 95.8% at the 
high. Regionally, the major increases were in the South 
Atlantic, South Central, Great Plains, and Southwest where 
acreages rose by 6.1%, 8%, 11.3% and 6.6% respectively. 
The acreages in these regions increased because their 
abundance of slack land at the low export level enabled 
expansion given the high export's larger commodity re­
quirements . 
Policy scenarios The policy alternatives caused a 
decline in the competitiveness of the South Atlantic region 
relative to the Base scenarios. The policy alternative also 
tilted the regional comparative advantage in favor of the 
South Central and Western regions. These effects were more 
apparent with the 5 Ton Limit than the Tax, and more so 
at the high export level where land availabiltiy became 
critical. For example, at the low export level, the North 
Atlantic and North Central were at relative regional 
comparative advantages under both policy alternatives. How­
ever, the 5 Ton Limit indicated a definite bias toward the 
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South Central. Also, at the high export level, the Tax in­
creased the competitiveness of the South Central and South­
west. regions. The 5 Ton Limit, on the other hand, caused a 
decline in the comparative advantage of the North Atlantic and 
the shift toward the Western regions included the Northwest. 
The two policies had opposite effects on land utiliza­
tion. The Tax was land saving relative to the Base scenarios, 
while the 5 Ton Limit was land using (Table 4.13). The 
decline in acreage with the Tax policy was predicated upon 
the complementarity between soil loss and land use. The 
tax on sediment is an indirect cost on soil loss and there­
fore land use, hence the decline in land use with the Tax 
policy. On the other hand, the 5 Ton Limit's restriction on 
gross soil loss/acre, limits intensive production and forces 
greater land use. 
Both policy alternatives required similar increases in 
land use to meet the high export's commodity requirements. 
Table 4.13 shows that the national changes in land use were 
6.7% and 6.3% for the Tax and the 5 Ton Limit respectively. 
Regionally, the South Central, Great Plains, and Western 
regions accounted for the principal increases. This was 
primarily because of the abundance of idle land in these 
regions. 
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Land utilization by class 
Base scenarios The increase in land utilization from 
the low to the high export Base scenario occurred primarily 
on land classes 3 and 4. Classes 3 and 4 dryland increased 
by 17% and 61% respectively compared to less than 2% for class 
1 and 2. In the case of irrigated acres, the analogous 
changes were 24% and 28% for classes 3 and 4 respectively, and 
no real changes on classes 1 and 2. 
The marginal increases in classes 1 and 2 dryland were 
caused by the relatively full utilization of these classes 
with the low export Base scenario. In the case of classes 
3 and 4, the abundance of idle land in the South Central and 
Great Plains was the main reason for the large jump. Table 
4.14 shows that increased use of class 3 and 4 dryland in 
the North Central and South Atlantic also aided increases in 
land utilization. 
The insignificant changes in classes 1 and 2 irrigated 
lands occurred for different reasons. In the case of class 
1, the major irrigated producing regions, the South Central 
and Great Plains, were previously fully utilized at the 
low export level, thus only limited increases were possible. 
However, with class 2 land, offsetting changes in irrigated 
land utilization was primarily responsible for the small 
increase. Under the high export Base, irrigated class 2 
Table 4.14. Regional endogenous dryland utilization by class®; low and high export 
scenarios (1000 acres) 
Land Class 1 Land Class 2 Land Class 3 Land Class 4 
Item Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Export Export Export Export Export Export Export Export 
North Atlantic 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
1,560 1,560 
1,560 1,560 
1,560 1,560 
6,842 6,842 
6,842 6,842 
6,842 6,842 
1,789 1,789 
1,789 1,789 
1,789 1,789 
1,105 1,105 
1,105 1,105 
1,031 1,105 
South Atlantic 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
10,216 10,216 
9,306 9,306 
9,314 9,143 
24,217 25,519 
22,479 24,437 
23,081 25,519 
3,448 4,361 
4,003 4,286 
4,105 4,390 
1,022 1,834 
1,133 1,774 
809 1,986 
North Central 
Base 29,779 29,779 83,658 84,808 15,713 17,391 4,337 5,553 
Tax 29,779 29,779 84,570 84,742 15,713 17,387 4,185 5,721 
5 Ton Limit 29,779 29,779 84,702 84,808 15,713 17,454 5,221 6,278 
South Central 
Base 4,689 4,689 26,034 26,315 10,708 13,054 3,581 5,758 
Tax 4,689 4,689 23,281 26,120 10,730 13,054 4,793 5,515 
5 Ton Limit 4,671 4,671 25,849 26,315 11,139 13,054 4,897 6,181 
Great Plains 
Base 5,007 5,007 30,527 30,527 18,624 22,904 3,324 7,627 
Tax 5,007 5,007 29,603 30,527 17,133 22,904 2,481 7,866 
5 Ton Limit 5,007 5,007 30,527 30,527 21,801 22,904 3,738 9,936 
^Land class 5 was negated from the table because of its relative insignificance. 
Table 4.14 (Continued) 
Land Class 1 Land Class 2 Land Class 3 Land Class 4 
Item Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Export Export Export Export Export Export Export Export 
Northwest 
Base 266 
Tax 289 
5 Ton Limit 289 
289 
289 
289 
3,960 
3,960 
3,960 
4,002 
3,960 
4,002 
3,967 
3,967 
4,171 
3,967 
3,967 4,182 
759 
220 
220 
899 
368 
1,608 
Southwest 
Base 370 386 555 1,291 399 399 245 323 
Tax 370 383 555 1,280 214 399 292 292 
5 Ton Limit 370 387 621 1,584 399 557 292 371 
United States 
Base 51,890 51,929 175,796 179,307 54,653 64,073 14,377 23,103 
Tax 51,003 51,015 171,295 177,912 53,552 63,792 14,212 22,644 
5 Ton Limit 50,993 50,838 175,585 179,601 58,917 64,333 16,211 27,468 
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land declined in the South Central region but increased in 
all other regions (Table 4.15) . Irrigated land classes 3 
and 4 were relatively unutilized at the low export level, 
hence their large increases. Table 4.15 shows that most of 
the changes occurred in the Great Plains and Western regions. 
Tax In general, the Tax resulted in a decline in 
all dryland classes relative to the Base scenarios. This 
decline in dryland classes was more apparent on classes 3 
and 4, and at the low export level. Reductions in classes 1 
and 2 dryland occurred in the erosive South Atlantic and South 
Central regions. This triggered the marginal decline in 
dryland use with the Tax relative to the Base scenarios. On 
classes 3 and 4 drylands, the reductions in land utilization 
were confined to the Great Plains and Western regions where 
a greater proportion of idle land afforded more flexibility. 
It should be noted that at the high export level, the re­
duction in flexibility resulted in a smaller fall in land 
use relative to the Base. 
The Tax policy was ineffective in changing national 
irrigated acres relative to the Base scenarios. National 
acreages of classes 1, 2 and 3 irrigated land under the Tax 
policy and Base scenarios were similar. Only on class 4 
irrigated land were there any real differences between the 
Base and Tax scenarios. The decline in the national irrigated 
Table 4.15. Regional endogenous irrigated land utilization by class®; the low and high export 
scenarios (1000 acres) 
Land Class 1 Land Class 2 Land Class 3 Land Class 4 
Item Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Export Export Export Export Export Export Export Export 
South Central 
Base 3,390 3,390 3,925 3,627 841 1,173 54 1 
Tax 3,390 3,390 3,687 3,645 1,042 1,173 54 1 
5 Ton Limit 2,914 3,140 3,158 3,500 835 766 54 37 
Great Plains 
Base 3,056 3,056 4,400 4,448 776 1,048 200 267 
Tax 3,056 3,056 4,312 4,448 776 1,048 200 267 
5 Ton Limit 3,056 3,056 4,374 4,570 776 1,048 200 267 
Northwest 
Base 285 337 2,627 2,705 792 826 176 319 
Tax 337 337 2,496 2,663 792 792 176 319 
5 Ton Limit 337 380 2,640 2,819 792 826 176 362 
Southwest 
Base 1,796 1,809 3,699 4,001 419 470 225 250 
Tax 1,796 1,809 3,826 4,204 419 470 175 217 
5 Ton Limit 1,796 1,900 3,868 5,022 419 550 225 250 
United States 
Base 8,529 8,594 14,790 14,921 2,829 3,518 657 838 
Tax 8,581 8,594 14,461 15,099 3,030 3,484 607 805 
5 Ton Limit 8,105 8,477 14,179 16,051 2,823 3,191 657 916 
Land class 5, and irrigated acres in the North Central were not reported owing to their 
relative insignificance. 
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acreages on class 4 land was a direct result of falling 
Southwest land use (Table 4.15) . 
5 Ton Limit The 5 Ton Limit policy had dual ef­
fects on land use. Independent of the export level, dryland 
acreages, particularly classes 3 and 4, increased relative to 
the Base scenarios. However, with irrigated acres, land use 
varied with the export level. At the low export level, 
irrigated acres generally declined with respect to the Base. 
This stemmed from the larger gross soil/acre of irrigated 
land relative to dryland. With the high export level, the 
demand for land resources fueled by the land using phenomenon 
of the 5 Ton Limit policy forced a greater utilization of 
irrigated acres relative to the Base. 
The 5 Ton Limit generated similar reductions in class 1 
dryland as the Tax policy. The reasons for the reduction were 
the same (falling South Atlantic and South Central acreages). 
On class 2 dryland, land use in the South Atlantic and South 
Central fell but the increased comparative advantage of the 
Southwest resulted in an unchanged national class 2 land use 
relative to the Base. With classes 3 and 4 dryland, the 
greater flexibility in land use stimulated a general increase 
in acres, hence the national difference in acreage between 
the Base and the 5 Ton Limit (Table 4.14). 
The 5 Ton Limit's decline in national irrigated acres 
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relative to the Base scenario was caused by falling land use 
in the South Central region. At the low export level, the 
fall in South Central acres was unmatched by rising acreage 
in any other region as evidenced on classes 1, 2, and 3 
lands (Table 4.15). However, the high export 5 Ton Limit 
scenario not only reduced the fall in the South Central, but 
it increased the comparative advantage of the Southwest. 
As a result, national irrigated acres tended to increase 
with respect to the relevant Base. 
Nitrogen and pesticides use 
Base scenarios The national utilization of nitrogen 
and pesticides increased by 4% and 18% respectively with the 
high export Base relative to its low export counterpart. 
More significantly, however, were the regional changes in the 
utilization of these resources. Tables 4.16 and 4.17 show 
that the Great Plains and Western regions had significant 
increases in nitrogen and pesticide use. These regions were 
essentially responsible for the national increases. The in­
creased production of coarse grains was the main factor in­
fluencing the nitrogen increase. The change in pesticide use 
was predicated upon both coarse grain production, and the 
slight tendency toward reduced tillage practices under the 
high export Base. 
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Table 4.16. Regional nitrogen use for all scenarios (1000 tons) 
Region Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
North Atlantic 370 365 344 408 369 340 
South Atlantic 668 803 1,170 667 823 1,127 
North Central 3,910 3,634 3,720 3,484 3,272 3,906 
South Central 1,837 1,764 1,904 1,989 1,980 1,945 
Great Plains 1,195 1,534 1,543 1,657 1,920 2,192 
Northwest 447 478 427 541 517 584 
Southwest 484 518 534 536 545 702 
United States^ 8,911 9,096 9,639 9,282 9,426 10,796 
^Total may not sum correctly owing to conç>uter rounding. 
Table 4.17. Regional pesticide use 
dollars^ 
for all scenarios in million 
Low Export High Export 
Region Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
North Atlantic 76 84 81 94 76 88 
South Atlantic 171 178 407 186 206 356 
North Central 944 969 972 978 987 988 
South Central 36 37 128 43 80 381 
Great Plains 53 302 219 197 602 656 
Northwest 14 16 14 25 21 49 
Southwest 10 12 17 14 16 98 
United States^ 1,303 1,599 1,837 1,537 1,988 2,615 
a 
The costs are comparable in terms of units of pesticide used since 
the costs are independent of shadow prices. 
b 
Totals may not sum correctly owing to conputer rounding. 
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Policy scenarios The policy alternatives increased 
the national utilization of both nitrogen and pesticides 
relative to the Base scenarios. The 5 Ton Limit policy was 
much more resource using than the Tax policy (Table 4.16). 
This was primarily because of the former's land using 
phenomenon and its greater impact in introducing reduced 
tillage. The greater comparative advantages of coarse grains 
to small grains with the high export 5 Ton Limit scenario 
(shown later) also aided the policy's large nitrogen in­
crease . 
National pesticide utilization with the Tax policy in­
creased by 23% and 30% at the low and high export levels 
respectively relative to the Base scenarios. Increased 
utilization was generally concentrated in the Great Plains 
where the proportion of minimum tillage was substantial. 
In the case of the 5 Ton Limit policy, the analogous national 
increases were 41% and 70% at the low and high export levels 
respectively. Increases in pesticides use were generally 
common to all regions, although the greater proportion of 
reduced tillage in the South Atlantic, Great Plains and South 
Central engendered substantial changes in these regions 
(Table 4.17). 
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Changes in Land Rents 
The imputed value of land "rents" is another measure 
of the relative comparative advantage among regions. The 
greater the rents, the more productive the region, and hence 
its relative comparative advantage. Also, land rents to­
gether with land utilization determine the regional absolute 
importance of land in terms of national output. In order to 
capture the regional changes in these two variables, average 
land rents are discussed in combination with the percentage 
regional contribution to gross national land values for the 
six scenarios. The dryland values of the above variables are 
first compared under the Base scenarios; then the effects of 
the policy alternatives are analyzed. The same procedure 
follows for irrigated land. 
Dryland rents 
Base scenarios The national average dryland rent 
with the high export Base scenario was more than double its 
low export counterpart. This is a clear indication of the 
greater premium placed on land as commodity requirements in­
creased. Regionally, land rents doubled in the Atlantic, 
North Central and Great Plains, but there were no real changes 
in the relative or absolute comparative advantage among 
regions. With both Base scenarios, the relative importance 
102 
of the Atlantic and North Central regions was dominant. 
These regions accounted for 75% of the U.S. gross dryland 
values (Table 4.18). 
Policy scenarios Regardless of the export level, 
the national average dryland rents with the policy scenarios 
increased relative to the Base values. The changes in rents 
with the Tax policy relative to the Base scenarios were 12% 
and 2% at the low and high export level respectively. With 
the 5 Ton Limit policy the corresponding increases were 37% 
and 390% at the low and high export respectively. 
The reason for the small changes in land values with 
the Tax compared to the 5 Ton Limit was tied to the dif­
ference in policy methodology. The Tax policy had two 
conflicting effects on land values. First, the tax on sedi­
ment depressed land use and land rents - "depressing effect." 
Second, the reduction in land utilization forced the reallo­
cation of production which increased the relative values of 
the less erosive to the more erosive lands. The overall effect, 
therefore, was ambiguous as exemplified by the regional di­
rectional inconsistencies in average dryland rents (Table 
4.18). In the case of the 5 Ton Limit policy, there were 
no opposing effects. Instead, the restriction on gross soil 
loss enhanced land using methods of production which 
caused average land values to increase. 
Table 4.18. 
Regions 
The regional percentage value of endogenous dryland and average endogenous 
dryland rents for all scenarios^ 
Low Export 
% value of endogenous 
dryland 
Average land 
rents ($) 
High Export 
% value of endogenous 
dryland 
Average land 
rents ($) 
North Atlantic 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
6 
6 
4 
23.45 
32.35 
28.37 
5 
5 
4 
52.26 
54.07 
152.99 
South Atlantic 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
15 
14 
12 
21.60 
23,66 
23.92 
16 
15 
15 
47.89 
47.81 
174.71 
North Central 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
54 
58 
59 
25.48 
29.43 
35.23 
54 
56 
55 
53.66 
54.11 
212.14 
South Central 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
13 
12 
11 
17.12 
18.29 
18.23 
12 
11 
8 
30.93 
30.49 
74.81 
Great Plains 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
10 
8 
11 
10.94 
10.66 
14.88 
11 
11 
14 
23.92 
22.73 
114.88 
^The rents are measured in 1972 dollars. 
Table 4.18 (Continued) 
Regions 
Low Export 
% value of endogenous 
dryland 
Average land 
rents ($) 
High Export 
% value of endogenous 
dryland 
Average land 
rents ($ ) 
Northwest 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
2 
2 
2 
12.55 
11.53 
15.00 
1 
1 
2 
19.80 
21.53 
75.16 
Southwest 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
_b 
-b 
5.52 
6.30 
8.02 
_b 
_b 
_b 
7.43 
8.59 
46.28 
United States 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
100° 
lOQC 
lOOC 
20.41 
22.85 
25.91 
100° 
lOOC 
100° 
41.66 
42.58 
162.51 
Values less than 1% are not considered in the table. 
Total may not add owing to computer rounding. 
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The low export Tax policy scenario substantially en­
hanced the comparative advantage of dryland crop production 
in the North Atlantic and North Central regions. Land 
rents for these two regions increased by more than any 
other region relative to Base scenarios (Table 4.18). Also, 
the absolute importance of the North Central improved four 
percentage points. Among the other major regions, dryland 
rents did not increase significantly, and the absolute im­
portance of dryland in the South Atlantic, South Central 
and Great Plains declined relative to the Base. The 
substantial fall in the absolute importance of the Great 
Plains (Table 4.18) was effected by reductions in both 
land utilization and rent. 
The high export Tax policy had similar effects on the 
regional comparative advantage of dryland production as its 
low export counterpart. However, less substitution among 
land classes dampened increases in regional rents. In 
fact, rents fell relative to the Base in the South Atlantic, 
South Central, and Great Plains. Also, the absolute im­
portance among regions was not altered as much as it was at 
the low export level. 
With the 5 Ton Limit policy, the regional comparative 
advantage of dryland crop production was biased away from 
the Atlantic and South Central regions and toward the North 
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Central and Great Plains. For at both export levels, the 
relative changes in land rents, and the absolute changes in 
national importance for these regions were indicative of the 
above bias (Table 4.18). It should also be noted that 
dryland rents increased for all regions with the 5 Ton 
Limit policy. Furthermore, the critical importance of land 
to the land using 5 Ton Limit policy was clearly apparent 
at the high export level where all regional dryland rents, 
at minimum, doubled relative to the Base. 
Irrigated land rents 
Base scenarios The national average irrigated land 
rent/acre was $57.72^ with the low export Base scenario. 
Among the regions, the South Central and Great Plains had 
larger than the national average rents, while for the 
Western regions, the opposite was true. Furthermore, in 
terms of absolute importance, the former two regions ac­
counted for 72% of the U.S. gross irrigated land values. 
With the high export Base scenario, the national average 
irrigated rent increased by 52% relative to the low export 
Base. Also, both the relative comparative advantage and 
the absolute importance of the Southwest increased (Table 
4.19). This was caused by the large increases in irrigated 
1 
The above was measured in 1972 dollars. 
Table 4.19. The regional percentage value of endogenous irrigated land and average irrigated 
land rents for all scenarios^ 
Low Export 
Regions 
% value of endogenous 
irrigated 
land 
High Export 
Average 
irrigated land 
rents 
% value of endogenous 
irrigated 
land 
Average 
irrigated lands 
rents 
South Central 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
43 
43 
33 
87.25 
90.14 
72.16 
40 
39 
28 
127.11 
123.07 
239.27 
Great Plains 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
29 
26 
30 
62.22 
58.65 
60.16 
29 
29 
28 
94.51 
92.43 
225.76 
Northwest 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
9 
9 
11 
31.03 
34.85 
36.30 
9 
10 
12 
49.98 
54.11 
155.66 
Southwest 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
19 
21 
26 
39.29 
44.41 
48.97 
21 
22 
31 
64.84 
64.81 
209.36 
United States 
Base 
Tax 
5 Ton Limit 
100° 
lOOb 
lOOb 
57.72 
59.70 
55.85 
lOOb 
100b 
lOOb 
87.60 
86.58 
212.70 
The rents are measured in 1972 dollars. 
Total may not add owing to computer rounding. 
108 
acres in that region under the high export Base. 
Policy scenarios The policy scenarios had varied 
effects on the national average irrigated land rents de­
pending on the export level. At the low export level, the 
policies had only a marginal effect on rents. The Tax 
policy increased rents by 3% relative to the Base while the 
5 Ton Limit decreased rents by an equal percentage. How­
ever, at the high export level, rents fell by 1% with the 
Tax policy but increased by 142% with the 5 Ton Limit 
policy. 
The directional variations in irrigated land rents with 
the policies occurred for different reasons. In the case 
of the Tax, the flexibility of land utilization at the low 
export level afforded greater land substitution and higher 
land rents. At the high export level, however, reduced 
flexibility enhanced the role of the "depressing effect" 
on land rents. The 5 Ton Limit policy, on the other hand, 
discriminated against irrigated land use because of its 
larger gross soil loss. As a result, irrigated land rents 
tended to decline as evidenced in the more erosive irri­
gated regions of the South Central and Great Plains (Table 
4.19). Also, at the high export level the regional in­
creases in irrigated land rents relative to the Base were 
substantially less than the corresponding change in the 
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average dryland rents. 
Regionally, the Tax policy did not significantly in­
fluence the comparative advantage of irrigated land use. 
The policy had a slight negative effect in the Great Plains, 
and it increased marginally the role of the Southwest. 
With the 5 Ton Limit policy, the changes in land rents 
shifted the regional comparative advantage, primarily away 
from the South Central and toward the Western regions. In 
fact, at the high export level, the change was sufficient to 
alter the ordering of the absolute importance of irrigated 
land among the regions (Table 4.19). Also, the gross re­
turns to irrigated land in the Western region increased 
from 30% at the Base to 43% with the 5 Ton Limit policy 
(Table 4.19). 
National and Regional Changes in 
Cropping Patterns 
Changes in crop production and acreage are the main 
variables considered in delineating differences in cropping 
patterns. Changes in these two variables determine varia­
tions in crop yields, thus the latter is excluded. First 
cropping patterns with the Base scenarios are compared; then 
given a Base, similar comparisons are made for the policy 
alternatives. Comparisons are made in delineating both 
national and regional changes in cropping patterns. 
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The national cropping patterns 
Base scenarios The greater commodity requirement at 
the high export level was clearly reflected in the national 
cropping patterns of the high export Base scenario. Relative 
to the low export Base, the production of row crops in­
creased (Table 4.20) despite substitution in the livestock 
sector away from corn grain and oil meals. The general in-
crease in production forced greater use of marginal lands, 
which accounted for the large increase in crop acres (Table 
4.21), and the general decline in crop yields (Table 4.22). 
Policy scenarios The policy alternatives resulted 
in a decline in row crop production relative to the Base 
scenarios. At the low export level, both policies generated 
a decline in all row crop production; hay was substituted 
for silage, and rotations of small grains and hay were in­
creased in order to reduce soil loss. With the low export 
Tax scenario, row crops were produced intensively, and the 
fall in production materialized on higher land classes. 
This caused total crop acres to fall relative to the Base 
(Table 4.21), and row crop yields to generally increase 
(Table 4.22). The low export 5 Ton Limit policy, on the 
other hand, produced row crops more extensively, and small 
grains rather than hay was used to compensate for soil loss. 
As a result, crop yield fell generally with respect to the 
Table 4.20. National endogenous crop production for all scenarios (million units) 
Low Export High Export 
Crop Unit Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Barley Bu 554 587 701 448 503 417 
Oats Bu 339 317 502 261 305 326 
Wheat Bu 1,900 1,900 2,084 1,926 1,918 1,935 
Corn grain Bu 6,436 6,645 6,042 6,188 6,407 6,558 
Sorghum grain Bu 798 577 876 944 677 636 
Silages* Tons 464 391 352 455 375 306 
Soybean Bu 2,974 2,928 2,873 3,714 3,662 3,600 
Cotton Bale 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Hays^ Tons 271 298 315 278 308 332 
^Silages include corn and sorghum. 
^Hays include legume and nonlegume hay, but not pasture. 
Table 4.21. The national distribution of endogenous acres by crop for all scenarios 
(000 acres) 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Small grains 68,319 69,330 80,466 72,415 72,980 65,077 
Corn and sorghum 
grains 74,111 72,317 72,525 76,070 71,836 84,475 
Silages 31,703 26,230 25,459 32,500 26,725 25,949 
Soybean 88,895 85,751 86,120 111,407 108,580 110,052 
Hays 35,013 44,140 48,268 38,624 48,574 57,055 
Cotton 7,406 7,097 7,401 7,154 6,962 8,055 
Other^ 23,514 17,461 13,482 15,198 13,073 7,699 
Total^ 328,961 322,326 333,721 353,368 348,730 358,362 
^This includes land in fallow and sugarbeets. 
^Total may not add because of computer rounding. 
Table 4.22. National crop yields for all scenarios 
Low Export High Export 
Commodities Unit Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit Limit 
Barley Bu 55. 56 57. 72 52, .90 56. 76 55, cn
 
00
 
66. 50 
Oats Bu 68. 49 65. 02 63, .55 62. ,24 59. 16 62, .11 
Wheat Bu 35, .58 35, .00 35, .12 32. 29 32. 62 36, .14 
Corn grain Bu 107. 92 107, .12 107, .16 108. 59 108. 07 90, .24 
Sorghum grain Bu 55. 12 56. 10 54. 25 49. ,45 53, .92 53, .84 
Corn silage Tons 14. 97 16. ,12 15, 42 14. 89 15, .17 12. 89 
Sorghum silage Tons 14. ,51 14. ,48 13. ,08 13. ,61 13. 48 11. ,03 
Soybean Bu 33. ,47 34. ,15 33, 36 33. ,34 33, .73 32. 71 
Cotton Bales 1. ,48 1. ,55 1. ,48 1. ,53 1. ,58 1. ,36 
Nonlegume hay^ Tons 13. ,74 10. 72 9, .78 13. ,03 9. 90 7. ,57 
Legume hay Tons 4. ,26 4. ,14 4. 22 4. ,02 4. 01 4. ,14 
^Nonlegume hay does not include pasture. 
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Base (Table 4.22). 
The high export Tax scenario had similar effects on 
cropping patterns as its low export counterpart. However, 
the greater demand for commodities at the high export level 
forced production on higher land classes. This shift in 
production dampened increases in crop yields. The 5 Ton 
Limit policy differed considerably at the high export level. 
Small grains were produced intensively on the lower land 
classes; the comparative advantage of corn grain was in­
creased, and hay rather than small grains was used to com­
pensate for soil loss on the higher land classes. Further­
more, both the land using phenomenon of the 5 Ton Limit 
policy and the high export's greater commodity requirements 
acted to reduce considerably crop yields with respect to 
the Base. Small grain yields were the only definite ex­
ception (Table 4.22). 
The North Atlantic cropping patterns 
Base scenarios The high export Base scenario 
resulted in a switch rather than an increase in the North 
Atlantic's crop production with respect to the low export 
Base. Total acreage increased marginally (Table 4.24), and 
the only dramatic changes were in the cropping patterns of 
small grains, corn grain, and hay. Tables 4.23 and 4.24 show 
Table 4.23. The North Atlantic endogenous crop production for all scenarios (million units) 
Low Export High Export 
Crop Unit Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Barley Bu 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Oats Bu 19 9 8 7 8 38 
Wheat Bu 175 187 192 166 122 61 
Com grain Bu 396 376 338 486 463 402 
Silages* Tons 13 11 11 11 11 14 
Soybean Bu 8 7 12 11 42 42 
Haygb Tons 10 11 11 11 11 14 
^Silages include corn and sorghum. 
^Hays include legume and nonlegume hay, but not pasture. 
Table 4.24. The North Atlantic distribution of endogenous acres by cost for all 
scenarios (000 acres) 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Small grains 5,098 5,125 5,241 4,571 3,656 2,814 
Corn and sorghum 
grain 3,661 3,446 3,150 4,397 4,202 3,819 
Silages 689 577 . 629 636 620 805 
Soybean 208 183 323 275 1,182 1,152 
Hays 1,639 1,963 1,878 1,981 1,981 2,883 
TOTAlf 11,295 11,295 11,219 11,859 11,640 11,473 
®Total may not add because of computer rounding. 
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that the production and acreage of small grain (principally 
oats) declined, but corn grain and hay increased. It should 
be noted that the production and acreage of corn grain in­
creased by approximately the same proportion, but the 
change in hay acreage was double the change in production. 
Evidently, the increased hay production occurred on the 
marginal lands. 
Policy scenarios The effect of the policy alterna­
tives on the North Atlantic cropping patterns varied de­
pending on the export level. At the low export level, both 
policies caused shifts to less erosive crops. The produc­
tion and acreage of small grains and hay increased, while 
the opposite changes were observed for row crops (Tables 
4.23 and 4.24). The 5 Ton Limit policy was more effective 
in generating the above shifts as evidenced by its impact on 
corn grain. 
At the high export level, the comparative advantage of 
soybean production under the policy alternatives was en­
hanced. Soybean production and acreage increased fourfold 
relative to the Base. Also noteworthy, is the large in­
crease in hay acreage. Hay was used to dampen gross soil 
loss increases emanating from greater row crop production. 
This effect was more pronounced with the 5 Ton Limit (Table 
4.24). 
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The South Atlantic cropping patterns 
Base scenarios The high export Base scenario improved 
the comparative advantage of soybean production in the South 
Atlantic region. Both soybean production and acreage in­
creased by 12% compared to the national soybean acreage in­
crease of 8% with respect to the low export Base. Small 
grains (principally wheat) also increased, while sorghum 
production declined (Table 4.25). 
Policy scenarios The effects of the policy alterna­
tives on the South Atlantic cropping patterns were inde­
pendent of the export level. Both policy alternatives had 
similar directional changes, but the 5 Ton Limit had by far 
the greater magnitude. The policies generally increased 
small grain, hay and corn grain production, while the pro­
duction and acreage of soybean and to a lesser extent cotton 
declined (Tables 4.25 and 4.26) . The more dramatic effect of 
the 5 Ton Limit policy was clearly expressed in its effects 
on small grains, soybean, and cotton. On small grains, the 
5 Ton Limit increased production sixfold with respect to the 
Base scenarios, compared to less than twofold for the Tax. 
With soybeans, acreage fell by 50% compared with 20% for the 
Tax, and in the case of cotton, production fell considerably 
but generally increased with the Tax. 
Table 4.25. The South Atlantic endogenous crop production 1 for all scenarios (milion units) 
Low Export High Export 
Crop Unit Base Tax 5 Ton 
. Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Barley Bu 24 24 48 24 24 26 
Oats Bu 13 2 117 13 2 47 
Wheat Bu 33 84 201 39 72 344 
Corn grain Bu 74 80 293 63 92 318 
Sorghum grain Bu 22 - - - - -
Silages^ Tons 18 23 26 19 19 15 
Soybean Bu 855 687 416 959 782 586 
Cotton Bales 8.7 9.0 8.2 8.9 9.0 2.3 
Hays^ Tons 28 35 36 26 35 36 
®Silages include corn and sorghum. 
^Hays include legume and nonlegume hay, but not pasture. 
Table 4.26. The South Atlantic distribution of endogenous acres by crop for all scenarios 
(000 acres) 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Small grains 1,364 2,512 7,919 1,676 2,218 9,934 
Corn and sorghum 
grain 994 911 4,135 718 1,248 4,944 
Silages 1,192 1,535 1,844 1,271 1,251 1,128 
Soybean 28,297 22,202 14,027 31,834 25,257 19,881 
Hays 1,235 3,822 4,062 634 4,040 3,658 
Cotton 5,861 5,952 5,364 5,839 5,835 1,537 
TOTAL® 38,943 36,933 37,350 41,970 39,846 41,079 
^Total may not add because of computer rounding. 
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The South Atlantic region revealed the classic distinc­
tion between the Tax and the 5 Ton Limit on cropping pat­
terns. The latter, in meeting the soil loss requirement, 
forced more rotations of the less erosive crops into the 
cropping plan, and reduced row crop production. The Tax, 
on the other hand, did not have an endogenous soil loss 
requirement, and the substitution away from erosive crops 
was less pronounced because of the region's relative 
greater productivity in these crops. 
The North Central cropping patterns 
Base scenarios The high export Base scenario 
generated 4.3 million acres or a 3% increase in the North 
Central's total crop acreage relative to the low export Base. 
The cropping patterns shifted toward increased row crop 
production. The production of soybeans and silage increased 
considerably, while the production of hay and to a lesser 
extent small grains declined. Soybean production and 
acreage increased by approximately the same percentage, 25%. 
With the other crops, the change in acreage generally ex­
ceeded production, an implication of the increased use of 
marginal lands. Silage production, for example, increased 
by 71% compared to a 153% increase in acreage, hays had a 
6% decline in production, but a 30% fall in acreage, and 
small grain production fell in aggregate although acreage 
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increased (Tables 4.27 and 4.28). The substitution of row 
crop under the high export Base resulted in the large decline 
in hay acreage (Table 4.28). 
Policy scenarios The policy alternatives had slightly 
different effects on cropping patterns depending on the export 
level. At the low export level, both policies caused substitu­
tion among row crops, away from corn and sorghum grains and 
silages, and in favor of increased soybean production. Pro­
duction of the less erosive crops, namely hay and small grains 
also increased. At the high export level, both policies dis­
couraged row crops, and hay rotations were increased to reduce 
soil loss. 
The main distinction between the two policies at the 
low export level was in their effects on small grains and 
silage. The 5 Ton Limit's soil loss restriction caused 
gre&ter acreage of small grains relative to the Tax. With 
silave, the 5 Ton Limit's acreage and production declined 
by 50% compared to the Tax's minimal reduction. 
At the high export level, the main distinction between 
the two policies was in their effects on small grains and hay. 
The 5 Ton Limit produced row crop extensively and used in­
creased hay rather than small grains rotations to accommo­
date the soil loss restriction. As a result, hay production and 
acreage increased considerably and small grain production 
and acreage declined (Tables 4.27 and 4.28). The Tax, on 
the other hand, increased both hay and small grains rotations. 
Table 4.27. The North Central endogenous crop production for all scenarios (million units) 
Low Export High Export 
Crop Unit Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Barley Bu 165 132 264 109 109 90 
Oats Bu 86 78 84 59 51 121 
Wheat Bu 537 597 749 565 614 446 
Corn grain Bu 5,561 5,284 4,923 4,808 4,611 4,682 
Sorghum grain Bu 16 20 15 57 18 9 
Silages® Tons 14 13 7 24 20 21 
Soybean Bu 1,774 1,901 1,887 2,195 2,262 2,128 
Hay&b Tons 41 43 43 38 39 59 
^Silages include corn and sorghum. 
^Hays include legume and nonlegume hay, but not pasture. 
Table 4.28. The North Central distribution of endogenous acres by crop for all scenarios 
(000 acres) 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Small grain 21,766 23,151 30,326 23,010 24,326 13,470 
Corn and sorghum 
grain 51,742 48,881 45,251 45,738 42,766 51,354 
Silages 869 809 424 2,199 1,943 2,289 
Soybean 49,326 52,971 53,389 61,660 63,426 60,904 
Hays 5,497 5,220 5,110 3,862 4,169 10,897 
Others® 4,422 3,478 1,224 1,479 1,284 717 
TOTAL^ 133,622 134,510 135,724 137,948 137,914 139,631 
^This includes land in fallow and sugarbeets. 
^Total may not add because of computer rounding. 
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The South Central cropping patterns 
Base scenarios The high export Base scenarios in­
creased the less erosive small grins and hays relative to the 
low export Base. On the other hand, row crop production 
remained relatively unchanged except for a 17% increase 
in soybean and a 6% decline in grain sorghum (Table 4.29). 
Cropping patterns with the high export Base scenario were 
also more extensive than under the low export Base. Apart 
from small grains, the percentage change in acreage was 
greater than the percentage change in production as more 
production occurred on higher land classes. 
Policy scenarios The policy scenarios generally 
acted to reduce row crop production, and increase production 
and acreage of small grains and hays relative to the Base 
scenarios. This effect was very distinct at the low export 
level but was not quite clear at the high export. The low 
export policy alternatives resulted in a decline in the 
production of all row crops relative to the Base, and in­
creases in the production and acreage of smaller grains arid 
hays. However, at the high export level the comparative 
advantage of soybean production was enhanced, and small 
grain acreage did not increase with both policies (Tables 
4.28 and 4.29). 
The main distinctions between the two policies on 
Table 4.29. The South Central endogenous crop production for all scenarios (million units) 
Low Export High Export 
Crop Unit Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 1 
Barley Bu 42 48 51 26 32 60 
1 
Oats Bu 28 24 73 37 47 73 
Wheat Bu 208 254 240 270 284 165 
Corn grain Bu 169 198 66 161 151 42 
Sorghum grain Bu 459 396 264 431 319 286 
Silages® Tons 218 208 171 220 207 151 
Soybean Bu 115 113 87 135 180 280 
Cotton Bales 1.5 1.0 1.5 1. 1 0.9 3.6 
Hays^ Tons 95 94 121 104 108 112 
^Silages include corn and sorghum. 
^Hays include legume and nonlegume hay, but not pasture. 
Table 4.30. The South Central distribution of endogenous acres by crop for all scenarios 
(000 acres) 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Small grain 8,600 10,083 10,668 11,000 11,916 8,059 
Corn and sorghum 
grains 11,082 9,263 5,409 9,963 6,737 4,647 
Silages 16,837 15,865 14,414 17,828 16,369 14,311 
Soybean 3,792 3,672 3,413 4,523 6,375 10,601 
Hays 13,726 13,791 21,784 17,104 18,877 20,300 
Cotton 1,175 717 1,478 892 452 2,369 
Others® 1,223 1,510 281 454 410 2,143 
TOTAL*) 56,435 54,901 57,447 61,764 61,135 62,430 
®This includes land in fallow and sugarbeets. 
^Total may not add because of computer rounding. 
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cropping patterns were in their effects on small grains at 
the high export level, and cotton regardless of the export 
level. The high export 5 Ton Limit policy generated a 
decline in the production and acreage of small grains rela­
tive to the high export Base scenario, while the high export 
Tax had the opposite result. The 5 Ton Limit's effect was 
transmitted through the increased comparative advantage of 
soybeans. As soybean acreage increased, the less erosive 
hay was substituted for small grains to accommodate the soil 
loss restriction. This caused the extensive production of 
hay and soybean, and intensive production of small grains. 
With the Tax policy, there was no soil loss restriction and 
the substitution was limited. On cotton, the 5 Ton Limit 
policy shifted production considerably from the South Atlantic 
to the South Central and Southwest. The Tax policy tended 
to switch production away from the South Central region. 
The Tax's regional changes in cotton production is a direct 
reflection of the relationship between the tax on sediment and 
regional productivity. The 5 Ton Limit's effect stemmed from 
the greater erosivity of the South Atlantic relative to the 
South Central. This erosivity difference and the soil loss 
requirement of the 5 Ton Limit caused the switch in cotton 
production from the South Atlantic to the South Central. 
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The Great Plains cropping patterns 
Base scenarios Total crop acreage in the Great 
Plains increased by 14% or 9.5 million acres from the low to 
the high export Base scenario (Table 4.32). The combined 
acreage of corn and sorghum grains increased by 150% 
(especially the former), while soybean production and 
acreage increased by more than 80%. These large changes in 
the above crops were tied to the greater demand for soy­
beans at the high export level. This directly influenced 
soybean cropping patterns, and indirectly induced greater 
corn and sorghum grain production in the Great Plains. The 
indirect effect acted through the increased production of 
soybeans in the North Central. This shifted the regional 
comparative advantage of corn grain production from the 
North Central to the Great Plains. The availability of land 
in the Great Plains also served as a springboard for in­
creased crop production. 
The high export base scenario also affected the 
cropping patterns of small grains and silages. Small grain 
production, namely through oats and wheat, declined by 11% 
relative to the low export Base, and silage production and 
acreage decreased by approximately 18%. 
Table 4.31. The Great Plains endogenous crop production for all scenarios (million units) 
Crop Unit 
Low Export High Export 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Barley Bu 205 263 222 219 234 136 
Oats Bu 189 199 215 133 186 42 
Wheat Bu 575 405 361 507 453 570 
Corn grain Bu 78 525 253 436 856 1,014 
Sorghum grain Bu 302 161 597 455 340 341 
Silages® Tons 157 92 95 129 68 61 
"Soybean Bu 222 220 471 414 394 564 
Havs^ Tons 22 75 63 58 75 57 
^Silages include corn and sorghum. 
^Hays include legume and nonlegume hay, but not pasture. 
Table 4.32. The Great Plains distribution of endogenous acres by crop for all scenarios 
(000 acres) 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Small grains 22,401 19,075 17,815 21,960 21,147 21,486 
Corn and sorghum 
grains 
5,159 7,870 12,971 12,922 14,452 18,718 
Silages 9,821 5,171 5,897 7,814 3,965 4)534 
Soybean 7,270 6,721 14,967 13,112 12,338 17,512 
Hays 9,085 14,496 10,180 9,897 14,559 9,528 
â 
others 12,555 9,701 8,072 10,091 8,783 6,447 
Total^ 66,291 63,034 69,902 75,796 75,244 78,225 
^This includes land in fallow and sugarbeets. 
^Total may not add because of computer rounding. 
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Policy scenarios The policy scenarios enhanced the 
comparative advantage of corn grain production in the Great 
Plains relative to the Base scenarios. The Tax policy 
generated a slight reduction in soybean production and 
acreage; hay was substituted for silage in livestock pro­
duction, and the only increase in row crops was in corn 
grain production (Tables 4.31 and 4.32). Wheat production 
also declined significantly, but the fall in small grains 
acreage was less pronounced because of the increased pro­
duction of barley and oats, and land class substitution. 
The 5 Ton Limit policy, on the other hand, increased 
the comparative advantage of both corn grain and soybean. 
This effect was more distinct at the low export level where 
production and acreage of coarse grains (corn and sorghum) 
and soybeans more than doubled. 
In the Great Plains, the substitution of hay in the 
cropping patterns under the 5 Ton Limit was not evident. In 
fact, this highlighted the main difference between the ef­
fect of the 5 Ton Limit policy on cropping patterns in: (a) 
the Great Plains, and (b) the North Atlantic, North Central 
and South Central. In the latter three regions, rotations 
of small grains were used to compensate for soil loss at the 
low export level and hays at the high export. However, 
in the Great Plains this was not observed. Small grains 
acreage in the Great Plains declined considerably relative 
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to the Base under the low export 5 Ton Limit, and the substi­
tution of hay was minimal. At the high export level, small 
grain production declined significantly relative to the 
Base, but acreage fell marginally. Further, the production 
and acreage of hays declined. 
The Northwest cropping patterns 
Base scenarios In the Northwest region, the high 
export Base scenario increased row crop production relative 
to the low export Base, but left the production and acreage 
of the less erosive small grains and hays unchanged (Tables 
4.33 and 4.34). The production of corn grain and silage in­
creased by 56% and 96% respectively while the corresponding 
changes in acreages were 66% and 120%. The increased use of 
marginal lands was the key factor influencing the disparity 
between the percentage changes in production and acreage. 
Policy scenarios The policy alternative differed 
considerably in their effects on cropping patterns relative 
to the Base scenarios. The Tax policy was generally passive 
relative to the Base. The 5 Ton Limit policy was more 
effective in altering cropping patterns. The effectiveness of 
the 5 Ton Limit was very apparent at the high export level 
as evidenced in the changes in crop production and acreage 
(Tables 4.33 and 4.34). 
Table 4.33. The Northwest endogenous crop production for all scenarios (million units) 
. Low Export High Export 
Crop Unit Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit Limit 
Barley Bu 20 24 20 20 20 7 
Oats Bu 4 5 4 11 11 4 
Wheat Bu 295 298 258 285 275 262 
Corn grain Bu 130 152 139 203 203 90 
Silages® Tons 6 6 6 11 9 22 
Hays^ Tons 9 9 11 9 9 22 
^Silages include corn and sorghum. 
^Hays include legume and nonlegume hay, but not pasture. 
Table 4.34. The Northwest distribution of endogenous acres by crop for all scenarios 
(000 acres) 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Small grains 6,902 7,415 6,240 7,602 7,230 6,745 
Corn and sorghum 
grains 1,242 1,672 1,343 2,059 2,160 908 
Silages 345 345 349 761 606 1,686 
Soybean - - - - - -
Hays 1,189 1,153 1,671 1,206 982 5,325 
Others® 3,547 2,163 3,145 2,234 1,966 47 
TOTAL*) 13,225 12,748 12,748 13,880 12,944 14,711 
®This includes land in fallow and sugarbeets. 
^Total may not add because of computer rounding. 
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The Southwest cropping patterns 
Base scenarios The relative abundance of idle land 
in the Southwest under the low export Base scenario was one 
of the main factors which triggered the general increase in 
crop production and acreage with the high export Base 
(Tables 4.35 and 4.36). The increases in crop production 
also enhanced livestock production through feed supply. 
Policy scenarios At the low export level, both 
policy alternatives were ineffective in influencing cropping 
patterns in the Southwest. Corn grain and cotton were the 
only two crops which showed any real change in production or 
acreage relative to the Base scenario (Tables 4.35 and 4.36). 
However, at the high export level, the Tax policy remained 
passive, but the 5 Ton Limit policy resulted in substitutions 
among row crops and increased production of hay. The high 
export 5 Ton Limit scenario also generated a large shift in 
the comparative advantage of cotton production from the 
erosive South Atlantic to the Southwest. This shift caused a 
fivefold increase in the production and acreage of cotton 
in the Southwest. The increase in the Southwest cotton pro­
duction also triggered the substitution of cotton for corn 
grain and silage in land use. 
Table 4.35. The Southwest endogenous crop production for all scenarios (million units) 
Low Export High Export 
Crop Unit Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Barley Bu 35 32 33 27 19 34 
Wheat Bu 77 73 82 95 98 87 
Corn grain Bu 27 31 30 31 31 9 
Silages* Tons 39 39 38 41 40 23 
Cotton Bales 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.1 5.1 
Hays^ Tons 30 31 30 32 32 37 
^Silages include corn and sorghum. 
^Hays include legume and nonlegume hay, but not pasture. 
Table 4.36. The Southwest distribution of endogenous acres by crop for all scenarios 
( Ô00 acres) 
Low Export High Export 
Item Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Small grains 2,179 1,961 2,249 2,573 2,480 2,559 
Corn and sorghum 
grains 228 268 261 268 268 87 
Silages 1,943 1,921 1,898 1,986 1,968 1,193 
Soybean - - -
- -
-
Hays 3,594 3,689 3,558 3,936 3,949 4,459 
Cotton 369 427 557 422 452 2,369 
Others® 783 619 781 879 868 125 
b 
TOTAL 9,096 8,885 9,304 10,064 9,985 10,792 
^This includes land in fallow and sugarbeets. 
^otal may not add because of computer rounding. 
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Endogenous Livestock 
Production 
As expected, the effects of the changes in regional 
cropping patterns filtered through to the endogenous live­
stock sector. It caused adjustments in livestock rations, 
and influenced the regional changes in endogenous live­
stock production. This section investigates the changes 
in the above two variables emanating from the six 
scenarios. 
The section is divided into two parts. First, the 
national livestock utilization of endogenous crops are com­
pared for all scenarios. The second part breakdowns this 
national feed use by livestock classes, and also compares 
regional changes in livestock production. 
National endogenous livestock feed use 
The high export Base scenario had little effect in 
altering national livestock feed use relative to the low 
export Base. Coarse grains were not altered, although the 
substitution of sorghum for corn was apparent. Small 
grains and oilmeals declined marginally, and the roughage 
mix remained relatively unchanged with limited substitution 
of hays for silage (Table 4.37). 
The policy alternatives resulted in a reduction in 
the utilization of row crops as livestock feeds relative to 
Table 4.37. Total endogenous 
units) 
crop use in the livestock sector for all scenarios (million 
Low Export High Export 
Crop Unit Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Corn grain Bu 4,023 4,233 3,630 3,790 4,009 4,159 
Sorghum grain Bu 516 295 593 644 377 336 
Barley Bu 344 376 491 278 292 207 
Oats Bu 228 207 391 150 195 216 
Wheat Bu 63 63 247 131 123 141 
Silages® Tons 464 391 352 455 375 306 
Oilmeals Cwt 746 724 698 731 707 677 
Hays^ Tons 271 298 315 278 313 332 
^Silages include corn and sorghum. 
^Hays include legume and nonlegume hay, but not pasture. 
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the Base scenarios. Small grains were substituted for oil-
meals in the dairy enterprise, and hays for silage in the 
beef sector. The coarse grain content remained dominant 
with both policy alternatives, although the two policies 
differed on the mix. The Tax policy favored corn while the 
5 Ton Limit sorghum- Two further points should be noted 
concerning the impact of the policy scenarios. First, the 
5 Ton Limit policy was more effective in altering ration 
compositions relative to the Base scenarios. Second, the 
high export 5 Ton Limit policy decreased the importance of 
small grains in livestock rations and substituted hay. 
Both of these points were predicated on the adjustments 
in cropping patterns. 
Beef cow rations and regional production 
National beef cow rations with the Base scenarios were 
similar. The major changes in the high export Base ration 
relative to the low export Base were the increased roughage 
content, principally silage, and the decline in oilmeals 
and wheat (Table 4.38). With the policy scenarios, the 
emphasis on row crop reduction enhancing the role of hay in 
the national beef cow ration composition, and both silages 
and oilmeals declined. This effect was independent of 
the export level, and more distinct for the 5 Ton Limit policy 
(Table 4.37). 
Table 4.38. National beef cow ration compositions for all scenarios (million units) 
Low Export High Export 
Crop Unit Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit Limit 
Oats Bu 31 — — — — — 
Oilmeals Tons 102 80 78 95 66 52 
Silages® Tons 140 139 94 161 86 21 
Hays^ Tons 218 241 252 228 256 280 
^Silages include com and sorghum. 
Hays include legume and nonlegume hay, but not pasture. 
\ 
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The high export Base scenario did not alter regional 
beef cow production relative to the low export Base. This 
followed from the marginal changes in beef cow ration compo­
sition. The policy scenarios, however, increased beef cow 
production in the South Atlantic, and generally reduced 
production in the South Central and Great Plains (Table 4.39). 
The greater importance of beef cow production in South At­
lantic stemmed from the increase hay production in the 
region. The 5 Ton Limit policy was more effective than the 
Tax in influencing changes in beef cow production. The 
high export 5 Ton Limit, in particular, forced substantial 
increases in beef cow production in the North Central and 
Northwest. These changes were a direct result of in­
creased hay production. 
Feeder beef rations and regional production 
National feeder beef rations varied slightly under the 
Base scenarios. The utilization of silage in the ration 
increased under the high export Base relative to the low 
export Base, and feed grains and hay components declined 
(Table 4.40). With the policy alternatives, rations differed 
depending on the export level. At the low export level, the 
Tax policy increased feedgrains and hays relative to the 
Base scenario, while the 5 Ton Limit's impact was primarily 
in increasing barley and hay. The high export Tax policy 
Table 4.39. Percentage regional distribution of beef cow production for all scenarios 
Regions 
Low Export 
North Atlantic 
South Atlantic 
North Central 
South Central 
Great Plains 
Northwest 
Southwest 
Base 
6 
8 
45 
28 
3 
10 
Tax 
9 
8 
43 
27 
3 
10 
5 Ton 
Limit 
High Export 
Base 
9 
7 
47 
23 
4 
10 
6 
8 
47 
25 
3 
11 
Tax 
9 
7 
47 
23 
3 
11 
5 Ton 
Limit 
9 
14 
41 
18 
7 
10 
4^ 
Table 4.40. National beef feeders ration compositions for ail scenarios (million units) 
Low Export High Export 
Crop Unit Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Corn grain Bu 69 102 60 5 7 115 
Sorghum grain Bu 94 90 88 102 100 132 
Barley Bu 200 215 249 122 120 -
Oilmeals Bu 100 100 99 100 103 98 
Silages* Tons 258 249 243 280 275 270 
Hays^ Tons 10 12 14 6 8 5 
^Silages include corn and sorghum. 
^Hays include legume and nonlegume hay, but not pasture. 
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was generally passive relative to the Base, but the 5 Ton 
Limit effected a greatef coarse grain component (Table 
4.40). 
Feeder beef production under the high export Base in­
creased marginally in the South Central and declined in 
the Great Plains relative to the low export Base (Table 
4.41). With the policy scenarios, the Tax was passive 
relative to the Base. However, the 5 Ton Limit caused 
increased production of fed beef in the South Atlantic, and 
reduced production in the Great Plains (Table 4.41). The 
5 Ton Limit's impact in the South Atlantic stemmed from 
the region's greater production of feedgrains. 
Dairy cow rations and regional production 
Dairy cow ration was virtually unaffected by all 
scenarios. As a result, regional dairy cow production was 
identical under all scenarios. 
Hog rations and regional production 
The movement from the low to the high export Base 
scenario resulted in no real change in the national composi­
tion of hog ration. However, the substitution of sorghum for 
corn within the coarse grain component, and the increased 
utilization of wheat in the small grains component were 
clearly apparent. Also, oilmeal utilization declined 
Table 4.41. Percentage regional distribution of beef feeders production for all scenarios 
Low Export High Export 
Regions Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit Limit 
North Atlantic 2 2 2 2 2 2 
South Atlantic 8 10 11 8 8 7 
North Central 7 7 5 7 7 6 
South Central 41 40 44 44 45 46 
Great Plains 28 27 24 25 24 19 
Northwest 3 3 4 3 3 7 
Southwest 11 11 10 11 11 13 
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(Table 4.42). With the policy alternatives, hog ration 
composition varied depending on the export level and the 
policy. The Tax policy was conistent across export levels 
in its effect on national hog rations. The policy was 
essentially passive with respect to the Base scenarios. 
However, the increased relative comparative advantage of 
corn grain and oilmeals in the rations was observed 
(Table 4.42). The 5 Ton Limit policy, on the other hand, 
increased the comparative advantage of sorghum rather than 
corn in the ration at the low export level and had the 
reverse effect at the high export (Table 4.42). It should 
also be noted that the low export 5 Ton Limit scenario in­
creased the substitution of small grains for corn and 
oilmeals in the hog rations, but at the high export level 
the small grain component declined considerably. 
Regional hog production showed the largest variability 
among the livestock classes. The North Central's proportion 
of national hog production fell from 85% at the low export 
Base to 68% at the high export Base, while hog production 
doubled in the Great Plains (Table 4.43). These large adjust­
ments in hog production hinged on the changes in the regional 
comparative advantage of corn grain and oilmeals, the two 
principal feed inputs. Relative to the low export Base, the 
North Central's production of oilmeal increased while that of 
Table 4.42. National hog ration compositions for ail scenarios (million units) 
Low Export High Export 
Crop Unit Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
; Limit Limit 
Corn grain Bu 1,603 1,806 1,314 1,442 1,691 1,800 
Sorghum grain Bu 218 - 301 338 73 
Barley Bu 18 18 28 12 16 
Oats Bu 93 86 146 72 79 
Wheat Bu 14 15 198 71 63 74 
Oilmeals Cwt 153 155 142 148 151 151 
Legume hay Tons 2 2 3 2 2 2 
Table 4.43. Percentage regional distribution of hogs production for all scenarios 
Low Export High Export 
Regions Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit Limit 
North Central 85 96 79 68 83 85 
Great Plains 15 4 21 32 17 15 
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corn grain fell under the high export Base. In the Great 
Plains, however, the production of both crops doubled. Hence 
the shift in regional hog production towards the Great Plains 
under the high export Base. 
The two policy alternatives had different effects on 
regional hog production depending on the export level. The 
Tax policy at both export levels resulted in large reductions 
in the Great Plains hog production, and increases in the North 
Central (Table 4.43). Evidently, the increased competitive­
ness of corn grain in the hog rations with the Tax policy 
generated the shift in hog production toward the North 
Central. Also, the effect was more pronounced under the low 
export Tax policy, where the North Central's competitiveness 
in corn grain and oilmeals increased relative to the relevant 
Base. 
The 5 Ton Limit policy was not consistent across export 
levels. At the low export level, the Great Plains benefited 
relative to the Base, but at the high export level the 
opposite occurred (Table 4.43). Again, the adjustment in 
the regional hog production hinged on the importance of corn 
grain and oilmeals. As small grains declined relative to 
corn grain and oilmeals in hog rations, regional hog produc­
tion tended to the North Central and away from the Great 
Plains. 
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The Regional Value of Endogenous 
Production 
This section compares the regional value of total endo­
genous agricultural production (crops and livestock) among 
the different scenarios. Shadow prices or cost of produc­
tion are used as the unit value of the commodities. Since 
shadow prices varied widely from scenario to scenario, the 
comparison of regional importance was made by computing the 
percentage regional contribution to the value of national 
production. 
Regional value of production 
Base scenarios The regional value of total endogenous 
agricultural production changed only marginally from the low 
to the high export Base scenario. The relative value of pro­
duction in the Great Plains increased by 0.8% points, and in 
the North Central and Southwest, reductions of 0.4% points 
occurred (Table 4.44). The increased use of formerly slack 
land in the Great Plains facilitated the region's relative 
improvement in the value of production under the high export 
Base. The greater importance of hog production in the Great 
Plains under the high export Base also aided the increase. 
The reduced comparative advantage of hog production in the 
North Central caused the fall in its relative importance. In 
the case of the Southwest, the large increase in prices at 
Table 4.44. The regional percentage value of total endogenous production for all 
scenarios® 
Low Export High Export 
Regions Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit 
North Atlantic 5.6 5.5 5.2 5.4 5.2 4.7 
South Atlantic 11.1 11.6 11.7 11.1 11.4 10.7 
North Central 29.5 31.2 29.7 29.1 30.8 33.7 
South Central 25.1 24.6 25.4 25.3 25.0 24.0 
Great Plains 18.6 17.5 18.1 19.4 18.1 16.4 
Northwest 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.7 3.8 
Southwest 7.3 7.2 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.7 
TOTAL* 100 100 100 100 100 100 
^Values were measured at cost of production. 
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the high export level were not fully transmitted, for the 
direct impact of soybean prices was not realized. Soybean 
production does not occur in the Southwest. 
Policy scenarios The policy scenarios had con­
siderably different effects on regional value of production 
relative to the Base scenarios. The Tax was consistent 
across export levels in influencing the regional values of 
endogenous production. At both export levels the policy 
increased the importance of the North Central and South 
Atlantic, but reduced the significance of the Great Plains 
and South Central relative to the Base scenarios. The effects 
on the North Central and Great Plains were very pronounced 
(Table 4.44). The larger comparative advantage of dryland 
production in the South Atlantic and North Central regions, 
coupled with the increased importance of livestock production 
were largely responsible for the changes in the importance of 
these regions relative to the Base scenarios. In the case 
of the Great Plains and South Central, the comparative ad­
vantage of both dry and irrigated lands fell relative to the 
Base, and the importance of livestock production was reduced. 
As a result, the relative importance of the two regions 
fell. The effect on the Great Plains was more pronounced 
primarily because of the large reduction in hog production. 
Unlike the Tax, the 5 Ton Limit policy was nonuniform 
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across export levels in its effect on the regional value of 
production. At the low export level, the 5 Ton Limit's relative 
changes were less pronounced than the Tax, but at the high 
export level the opposite occurred. At the low export level 
the 5 Ton Limit increased the relative importance of the 
South Atlantic, North Central and South Central, but 
decreased the significance of the Great Plains. The 
changes in livestock production were evidently the dominant 
factors underlying the above regional movements. In the South 
Atlantic and South Central regions, increased beef production 
enhanced the relative importance of these two regions. The 
decline in beef and hog production was responsible for the 
North Central * s marginal change. In the case of the Great 
Plains, the large decline in beef production was the main 
factor. 
The high export 5 Ton Limit policy resulted in consider­
able variability in the regional value of production relative 
to the high export Base. The scenario caused significant 
gains to the North Central and Northwest, and substantial 
losses to the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, South Central 
and Great Plains. In fact, the scenario made these indi­
vidual regions better (worse) off relative to any other 
scenario (Table 4.44). Livestock production was again the 
critical factor influencing the regional changes. For 
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example, in the North Central, the greater importance of hog 
and beef cow production together with the relative compara­
tive advantage of dryland production resulted in 4.6% point 
increase relative to the high export Base scenario. 
The Endogenous Commodity 
Shadow Prices 
Changes in shadow prices 
Base scenarios Table 4.45 shows an index of the 
national average shadow prices of all endogenous commodities 
for the six scenarios. The low export Base is used as the 
index. The table indicates that commodity shadow prices 
under the high export Base were substantially larger than 
at the low export Base. Coarse grains, small grains, and 
oilmeal prices increased by more than 25%, while the prices 
of roughages and livestock commodities changed by less than 
that amount. 
The above changes in shadow prices can be attributed 
directly or indirectly to the increased export demand for 
soybeans at the high export level. The greater soybean demand 
directly influenced the 36% increase in oilmeal prices. 
It also indirectly effected the reduction in resources avail­
able to other crops, thereby generating the overall upward 
price movement. 
Table 4.45. An index of shadow prices of the endogenous commodities, and average food cost per 
capita for all scenarios (the low export base = 100) 
Low Export High Export 
Item Unit Base Tax 5 Ton Base Tax 5 Ton 
Limit Limit 
Barley Bu 100 107 107 130 140 274 
Oats Bu 100 107 119 144 137 278 
Wheat Bu 100 110 108 135 141 254 
Corn grain Bu 100 109 104 128 133 204 
Sorghum grain Bu 100 110 100 127 133 229 
Oilmeals Cwt 100 115 129 136 151 445 
Cotton Bale 100 104 109 115 116 184 
Silages^ Ton 100 105 105 122 123 196 
Legume hay Ton 100 104 106 124 127 248 
Nonlegume hay Ton 100 106 107 128 131 248 
Pork Cwt 100 106 106 116 120 196 
Milk Cwt 100 103 102 108 110 141 
Beef feeders Head 100 103 104 116 116 185 
Fed beef Cwt 100 104 105 116 117 189 
Nonfed beef Cwt 100 104 105 116 117 189 
Food cost 100 104 105 116 118 190 
per capita 
^Silages include corn and sorghum. 
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Policy scenarios The policy scenarios did not 
create redundant restrictions on resource allocation. As a 
result, the shadow prices of the endogenous coiranodities in­
creased relative to the Base scenario (Table 4.45). At 
the low export level, both policies resulted in basically 
similar changes in commodity shadow prices except in the 
case of coarse grains, oilmeals and cotton. The 5 Ton Limit 
policy generated lower coarse grain, but larger oilmeal and 
cotton prices relative to the Tax policy. The lower price 
of coarse grains with the 5 Ton Limit policy resulted from 
the large reduction in coarse grain production, and the 
greater substitution of small grains in the national 
cropping pattern. With oilmeals and cotton, the extensive 
use of reduced tillage practices, and the shift in produc­
tion to less productive regions were responsible for the 
larger prices. 
The two policies had sharply contrasted effects on 
commodity shadow prices at the high export level. The Tax 
policy resulted in marginal increases in commodity prices 
relative to the high export Base. Only oilmeals had any 
significant change which amounted to 10% above the high 
export Base. On the other hand, the 5 Ton Limit policy 
generated more than an 80% increase in the prices of small 
grains, sorghum grain, oilmeal, and hays relative to the 
159 
high export Base. Corn grain and cotton prices also in­
creased significantly but by less than 80%. Oilmeal prices 
had by far the largest change, more than threefold the high 
export Base (Table 4.45). The elasticity of livestock prices 
with respect to crop prices was less than one. 
The extremely large changes in the shadow prices of com­
modities with the 5 Ton Limit policy at the high export 
level stemmed from the severe limitation on land availability. 
In the case of the Tax policy, the small changes reflected 
the reduced substitution of less for more erosive lands at 
the high export level. 
Changes in food cost per capita 
Table 4.45 also shows the relative endogenous food cost 
per capita associated with each scenario using the low 
export Base as an index. The costs used were in terms of 
shadow prices or cost of production. 
Cost per capita with the high export Base was 16% 
greater than its low export counterpart. With the policy 
alternatives, food cost per capita varied depnding on the 
export level. At the low export level, the food cost indices 
for the two policies were almost identical, and the increases 
relative to the Base were marginal (4 to 5%). At the high 
export level, the increase in the Tax's food cost per capita 
was negligible relative to the high export Base. However, 
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the large increases in shadow prices under the 5 Ton Limit 
policy generated a 64% increase in the food cost index 
relative to the Base. This change represents an increase of 
90% above the low export Base. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The study was divided into two parts. First, the study 
investigated the changes in agricultural production, costs and 
soil loss which emanated from two alternative demands for 
U.S. agricultural exports. A linear programming model was 
used to analyze the above effects using fixed point pro­
jections for 1985 U.S. exports. The low export corresponded 
to the OBERS E* high, and the high export was an adjustment of 
the OBERS E' biased in favor of soybean and away from small 
grains. The second aspect of the study stemmed from the en­
vironmental problems of soil sedimentation which emanated 
from agricultural production. The study viewed sediment as a 
negative externality on society and used two policies in the 
manner of the Standards and Prices framework to effect the 
same national level of sediment control. The two policies 
were: (a) a physical regulation of 5 tons of gross soil loss 
or less on all crop production activities (5 Ton Limit), and 
(b) a tax on sediment (Tax) which generated the same national 
mainstream sediment standards as observed with the 5 Ton 
Limit. The two policies were compared at both export levels 
with the results from the first part of the study providing 
the adequate no policy set of reference points. 
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Findings 
Sediment and soil loss The comparison of the Base 
runs indicated that the greater production of row crops 
necessitated by the high export Base scenario led to a 14.5% 
increase in sedimentation (83 to 95 million tons). Further, 
national gross soil loss increased by 7%. Also, the national 
distributions of tillage and conservation practices were 
virtually unaltered. 
In the case of the policy alternatives, sediment load 
was similar in congruent with the objectives of the study. 
Regionally, however, the Tax was more effective than the 5 
Ton Limit in reducing sediment in the Great Plains and to a 
lesser extent, in the Western regions. One reason for this 
was the relative ease of introduction of reduced tillage 
systems in these regions under the Tax policy. On gross soil 
loss, there was a large diversity with the two policies. 
The Tax policy was less effective because in the Atlantic and 
South Central, highly erosive regions, greater productivity 
served to dampen the effect of the tax on sediment in inducing 
soil conserving practices - an effect captured in the theo­
retical analysis of Chapter II. The 5 Ton Limit Policy, on 
the other hand, resulted in large shifts towards soil con­
serving practices (minimum tillage in particular), and move­
ments away from row crop production. 
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Resources The high export demand for commodities 
resulted in an increase in the total land utilization from 
89.6% under the low export Base to 95.8% with the high 
export Base. Also, the bias towards more coarse grain pro­
duction aided 4% and 18% increases in nitrogen and pesticide 
use respectively. 
In the case of the policy scenarios, the 5 ton limit 
proved to be land using relative to the Base, while the Tax 
was land saving. This followed from the mechanisms of the 
two policies. The tax on sediment with the Tax policy was 
an indirect cost of using land. The 5 Ton Limit, however, 
increased acreage to compensate for formerly optimal pro­
duction activities which were in excess of 5 ton limit on 
gross soil loss/acre. 
Both policies also resulted in greater utilization of 
nitrogen and pesticides relative to the Base. However, the 
land using phenomenon of the 5 ton limit policy coupled 
with its greater introduction of reduced tillage encourages 
more nitrogen and pesticide use than the Tax policy. These 
differences were very apparent at the high export level. It 
should be noted that both nitrogen and pesticides are positive 
arguments in the degradation of environmental aesthetics. 
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Land rents The increased demand for land at the high 
export level was captured in the rising shadow prices of land 
(rents). With the high export Base, the national average 
dryland rent more than doubled relative to the low export 
Base, while the irrigated counterpart increased by 52%. 
Despite these changes, the relative regional gross dry and 
irrigated land values remained unchanged. The Atlantic and 
North Central accounted for 75% of the national total value 
of dryland, and the South Central and Great Plains approxi­
mately 70% of the total irrigated land values. 
The average dryland rents increased with both policies, 
but more so with the 5 Ton Limit. Also, unlike the Tax 
policy, the regional directional changes in dryland rents 
with the 5 Ton Limit were uniformly positive relative to the 
Base. The reason for the dual effect with the Tax policy was 
linked to two opposing influences namely: (a) the depressing 
effect on land values caused by the tax on sediment, and (b) 
the increased relative value of less to more erosive lands. 
Both policies reduced the relative importance of dry­
land production in the erosive Atlantic and South Central 
regions, but increased the significance of the North Central. 
In the Great Plains, the two policies had opposing effects. 
The 5 Ton Limit increased the comparative advantage of dry­
land in the Great Plains because of the region's gross soil 
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loss efficiency. However, with the Tax scenarios land rents 
declined relative to the Base. This followed from the greater 
effect of the tax in reducing sediment in the Great Plains. 
On irrigated land rents, the two policies had slightly 
different effects. With the low export Tax policy, the 
flexibility of land use resulted in an increase in the 
national average land rent relative to the Base. However, 
at the high export level, the flexibility was reduced and 
the national average rent fell relative to the Base. On the 
other hand, the 5 Ton Limit policy discriminated against irri­
gated land because of its larger gross soil loss. As a result 
irrigated land rents tended to decline at the low export level, 
and increased comparatively less than its dryland counterpart 
at the high export level. 
The Tax policy had little influence in shifting the rela­
tive regional importance of irrigated land. On the other hand, 
the 5 iton Limit tilted the distribution substantially away 
from the South Central and toward the Southwest. A change 
which was linked to gross soil loss efficiency. 
Crop and livestock production patterns The high export 
Base scenario increased crop production relative to the low 
export Base, away from small grains and silages, and towards 
more hay and soybeans. Also, the large increases in crop 
production forced marginal land use; an effect manifested in 
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the fall in crop yields. 
With the policy scenarios, the less erosive small grains 
were substituted for row crops at the low export level. 
However, at the high export level, hay rather than small 
grains was substantially increased to compensate for soil loss 
emanating from row crops. These effects were more pronounced 
with the 5 Ton Limit policy. 
In the case of the livestock enterprises, the Base 
scenarios did not significantly influence production. The 
regional distribution of milk production was unaltered; the 
beef sector showed a slight tilt at the high export level to 
the South Central, and only hog production showed any real 
change. The greater relative comparative advantage of corn 
grain in the Great Plains under the high export Base in­
duced a doubling of hog production in the region, and a 
reduction in the North Central * s hog production relative to 
the low export Base. 
With the policy scenarios, milk production was unaltered 
relative to the Base scenarios, and in the beef sector, the 
roles of the South Atlantic and North Central were enhanced. 
The effect on the beef sector was more pronounced with the 
5 Ton Limit policy, and the importance of the South Atlantic 
was basically limited to the low export level. On hog 
production, both policies tended to benefit the North Central 
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relative to the Great Plains because of the comparative ad­
vantage of the former in soybeans and com grain production. 
The only exception was with the low export 5 Ton Limit policy 
where the substitution of small grains for soybeans and corn 
grain had the reverse effect. 
Regional values of endogenous production Overall, the 
high export Base scenario had little effect in influencing 
the relative regional total values of crop and livestock 
production with respect to the low export Base, the relative 
importance of the Great Plains, and to a lesser extent the 
South Central, was enhanced under the high export Base. This 
was caused by the increased utilization of previously slack 
land, and the greater significance of the two regions in 
livestock production. 
With the policy alternatives, the Tax policy was 
essentially uniform across export levels. It increases the 
relative importance of the North Central and South Atlantic, 
and decreased the significance of the Great Plains and the 
South Central. In the case of the former two regions, 
their greater productivity coupled with their increased im­
portance in livestock production under the Tax aided the 
changes. In the Great Plains and South Central, the 
relative comparative advantage of livestock production 
fell; hence the direction of the change. 
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The 5 Ton Limit's effect was nonuniform across export 
levels. At the low export level, the policy did not alter 
regional farm income shares relative to the Base. However, 
at the high export level, the policy substantially enhanced the 
comparative advantage of the North Central and Northwest, 
and had a considerable adverse effect in the Atlantic, 
South Central and Great Plains. This was caused by the 
dramatic changes in crop and livestock production under the 
high export 5 Ton Limit. 
Commodity shadow prices CoMnodity shadow prices 
with the high export Base scenario increased considerably 
relative to the low export Base. Coarse grain prices rose 25%, 
small grains even more, oilmeal 36%, and roughages and live­
stock products less than 25%. These increases in shadow 
prices led to a 16% jump in the consumer food bill evaluated 
at shadow prices (cost of production). 
The policy alternatives further accentuated the upward 
movement in commodity shadow prices. At the low export level, 
shadow prices with the two policies increased almost iden­
tically except for oilmeals and cotton. Larger prices for 
these two commodities were generated with the 5 Ton Limit 
owing to the extensive use of soil conserving practices and 
the large regional shifts in crop production. At the high 
export level, the Tax policy had little effect on commodity 
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shadow prices, and the only substantial change was a 10% 
increase in oilmeal prices relative to the high export Base. 
In the case of the 5 Ton Limit policy, the land using 
phenomenon induced severe pressure on land at the high 
export level, and shadow prices rose by about 80% compared to 
the high export Base. Oilmeals had the largest increase -
threefold. 
These changes in commodity shadow prices were re­
flected in the consumer food bill. Domestic food cost/ 
capita with the low export policies increased by 4-5% rela­
tive to the Base. However, at the high export level, the Tax 
and 5 Ton Limit policies generated 2% and 63% increases 
respectively relative to the high export Base. The small 
increase in the domestic food bill under the high export 
Tax scenario stemmed from the reduced effectiveness of the 
tax on sediment at the high export level. The effect 
caused less substitution relative to the Base among land 
classes and among regions in producing commodities. On the 
other hand, the large increase in the domestic food bill 
under the high export 5 Ton Limit was linked to the opposing 
influenced of: (a) the 5 Ton Limit's land using phenomenon, 
and (b) the decline in slack land at the high export level. 
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Implications 
With regard to the first aspect of the objective, the 
study confirmed that a greater demand for exports would 
prolong the use of conventional tillage methods, and there­
fore increase gross soil loss, and sediment to the major 
river basins. 
The results also demonstrated that the higher export 
demand, as specified, might have little effect on the 
regional distribution of the total value of agricultural pro­
duction, although the tendency for increased gross farm reve­
nues in the Great Plains and South Central regions was 
apparent. These two regions had a relative abundance of 
unutilized land at the low export level which explained 
their increasing regional importance. 
Shadow prices of land and commodities would also increase 
under the high export level demand prediction. The shadow 
prices of commodities such as oilmeals, would not only rise 
substantially, but their effect on the consumer food bill 
was predicted to be 16% larger than at the low export Base. 
Such an increase in the domestic food bill can have im­
portant ramifications in terms of the domestic consumers* 
acceptance. 
In the case of the second aspect of the objectives, the 
comparison of two policies aimed at generating the same national 
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sediment control to the main river basins, the Tax policy was 
found to be less effective than the 5 Ton Limit in intro­
ducing soil conserving techniques (particularly minimum 
tillage). This resulted in a larger gross soil loss and 
gross soil loss/acre with the Tax policy. However, the 
national average annual gross soil loss/acre was considerably 
below 5 tons despite the Tax's inefficiency in controlling 
gross soil loss in the highly erosive South Atlantic region. 
The Tax policy proved to be land saving and not land 
using as the 5 Ton Limit policy. This difference in land 
use led to the greater use of nitrogen and pesticides with the 
5 Ton Limit. The 5 Ton Limit, required therefore, a greater 
utilization of resources in satisfying demand requirements, 
and implied more nonsediment forms of pollution than the 
Tax. 
Production of crops and livestock would not be altered 
as significantly with the Tax policy as in the case of the 5 
Ton Limit alternative. The impact of the 5 Ton Limit policy 
would be particularly dramatic at the high export level 
where land availability would become critical. This is 
evidenced by the regional changes in the total value of 
agricultural production under the high export 5 Ton Limit 
policy. 
Land rents and commodity shadow prices would increase 
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considerably more with the 5 Ton Limit than with the Tax 
policy. This would be true particularly in periods of high 
export demands as observed with the high export 5 Ton Limit. 
The large increases in commodity prices and in the domestic 
consumer food bill under such a policy not only alluded to 
the domestic reaction to the prices, but also to the 
competitiveness of American exports on world markets. 
Alternatively, if the model had incorporated a downward 
sloping demand for exports rather than fixed point quanti­
ties, it would seem very likely that the 5 Ton Limit 
policy would have resulted in lower prices and export quanti­
ties than those predicted by the model. 
Recommendations 
The recommendations of the study can be divided into 
two parts, namely: (a) from the decision-maker's stand­
point of choosing the best overall policy instrument, given 
the objectives and the analysis of the study, and (b) in 
terms of acquiring further information through future 
studies of the sediment problem. 
In the former case, if one were to assume equal enforce­
ment costs for both policies, then the obvious policy measure 
would be a tax on sediment. This is based on the less 
drastic effect in changing regional production, the small 
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rise in the domestic food bill, the greater prospect of Ameri­
can exports maintaining their competitive superiority, the 
adequate gross soil loss control, and the less demands on land 
and other resources. Also, a tax on sediment provides a 
continuous incentive to reduce sediment, while a regulation 
as the 5 Ton Limit represents a fixed standard which pro­
ducers must achieve. 
Politically, a tax on sediment may not be a sagacious 
method of restricting sediment, but the analysis of the 
study illustrates the adverse cost effects of using a regu­
lation as the 5 Ton Limit. The political criterion, how­
ever, renders a look at less volatile alternatives for future 
study; one of which is through a subsidy scheme. There are 
some difficulties associated with such a recommendation. 
First, where should the subsidy be placed? Should it be tied 
to gross soil loss or conservation practices? Second, there 
exists the problem of determining the size of the subsidy 
which further increases the subjectivity of the analysis. 
Third, subsidization may lead to a large increase in the use 
of marginal productive lands with little erosion problem in 
order to take advantage of the subsidy. Thus, output may 
not change substantially, but the cost of subsidization would 
increase. 
Other recommendations involve dropping the assumption 
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that the 5 Ton Limit gives the optimal sediment standard, and 
the consideration of less restrictive standards as those 
obtained from 7-10 Ton Limits on gross soil loss/acre. One 
can also pursue zone effluent charges which would yield a 
lower total social cost than a single charge as shown by 
Kneese and Bower [23]. The zones may be river basins or PAs, 
and the standards associated with each may be predetermined. 
Some standards have been discussed by Wade and Heady [44]. 
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